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3 
The Post-Industrial Patent System 
John R. Thomas* 
INTRODUCTION 
Post-industrial society has at last come to the regime of patents.  
No longer content merely with the proprietization of traditional 
technologies, the patent bar has constructed a bold new vision of 
the patent system.  For as we read with amusement patent instru-
ments claiming methods for swinging a golf club, treating cancer 
or administering a mortgage, we come to realize that the patent law 
seems poised to embrace the broadest reaches of human experi-
ence. 
The recent opinions in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signa-
ture Financial Group, Inc.1 and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communica-
tions, Inc.2 suggest that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit will pass an approving glance upon much of this Patent Office 
work product, if called upon to do so.3  In State Street, the plaintiff 
held a patent for a data processing system consisting of software 
 
 *Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University.  The author gratefully 
acknowledges the receipt of a writing grant from Oracle Corporation.  The many thought-
ful remarks of participants in the Symposium on Intellectual Property Rights in Methods 
of Doing Business, and in particular those of Joseph Rolla, Pam Samuelson, Richard 
Stern and Allen Wagner, contributed mightily to this Article.  Thanks are also owed to 
the University of Tokyo Faculty of Law and the Institute of Intellectual Property of To-
kyo, Japan, for their support during the drafting of this Article, and to Marty Adelman, 
Rochelle Dreyfuss and Mark Lemley for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.  A 
predecessor version of this Article appeared in volume 40 of the Boston College Law Re-
view. 
1. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
2. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
3. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created by the Fed-
eral Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), possesses exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent 
acquisition and infringement cases.  The Patent Office is more properly known as the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office.  See 35 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
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for managing a stock mutual fund.  The Federal Circuit not only 
held that data transformation through a series of mathematical cal-
culations presented patentable technique, it took the opportunity to 
obliterate the venerable proscription on patenting so-called “meth-
ods of doing business.”4 
 The Excel opinion came next, holding that a technique for 
arranging information “comfortably” fell within the scope of pat-
entable subject matter.5  In the process the court obliterated the 
venerable requirement that an invention work a “physical trans-
formation” in order to be patentable.6  In its place the Federal Cir-
cuit required only that a claimed process achieve a useful result, an 
exceptionally lenient standard that appears to place few limitations 
on the possibilities for private appropriation.  Keenly aware of 
these holdings, applicants have besieged the Patent Office with ap-
plications ranging from financial software to Internet-based busi-
ness models.7 
State Street and Excel present the latest in a series of cases test-
ing the boundaries of the “useful arts,” the constitutional expres-
sion of subject matter appropriate for patenting.8  Embodying the 
current understanding of this term to mean the “technological 
arts,”9 the patent statute further refined patentable subject matter to 
 
 4.   149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 5.   Excel, 172 F.3d at 1361. 
 6.   Id. 
7. See Jonathan Bick, Adapting Process Patents to Cyberspace, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19, 
1998, at 1; Mark Walsh, Internet Companies Seek Protection: Apply For Patents to 
Guard Technology, But Litigation May Slow Commerce, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Dec. 21, 
1998 at 3; Carol B. Oberdorfer, Patents: ‘Boom’ in Business Method Patent Filings Has 
Followed ‘State Street’ Ruling, PTO Says, BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 
DAILY, Dec. 10, 1998, at D2 (PTO Deputy Commissioner Dickinson expects approxi-
mately 300 business method patents to issue in 1999) [hereinafter ‘Boom’ in Business 
Method Filings]. 
8. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  This provision provides both for copyright legisla-
tion, to promote the development of “science” by “authors,” and for patent legislation, to 
promote the development of the “useful arts” by “inventors.”  See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 
952, 958 (CCPA 1979), aff’d sub nom., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) 
(“[T]he constitutionally-stated purpose of granting patent rights to inventors for their dis-
coveries is the promotion of progress in the ‘useful Arts,’ rather than in science.”). 
9. See Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The exclusive 
right, constitutionally derived, was for the national purpose of advancing the useful arts—
the process today called technological  innovation.”); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 883 
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include processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of 
matter.10  The first of these terms appears the most troubling, par-
ticularly in light of its circular statutory definition as a “process, art 
or method.”11  For without more the scope of the statutory term 
“process” appears co-extensive with nearly any possible endeavor, 
as almost any imaginable function can be articulated in a series of 
steps in the fashion of a patent instrument.12 
Determining the appropriate subject matter for patenting is im-
portant because a paucity of constraining doctrines allay the pro-
prietary rights associated with granted patents.13  The adjudicated 
infringer need not have derived the patented invention from the 
patentee, as liability rests solely upon a comparison of the text of 
the patent instrument with an accused infringement.14  The patent 
law as well lacks a robust experimental use exemption in the na-
ture of copyright law’s fair use privilege.15  The doctrine of patent 
misuse too has been reduced to a withered remnant of its once hale 
self.16  The decision to subject particular areas of endeavor to the 
patent system is therefore of great moment, in effect subjecting en-
tire industries to a private regulatory environment with constantly 
shifting contours.  Given the contemporary movement towards an 
increasingly ambitious sense of patentable subject matter, further 
 
(CCPA 1970); In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003-04 (CCPA 1972) (Rich, J., concur-
ring) (“The phrase ‘technological arts,’ as we have used it, is synonymous with the phrase 
‘useful arts’ as it appears in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.”). 
10. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
11. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994). 
12. See Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection 
for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 
1033-34 (1990) (urging that the extent of patentable subject matter should not be under-
stood to overlap with the ordinary, and exceptionally broad, meaning of the term “proc-
ess”). 
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) (the patentee has the exclusive right to make, use, 
sell, offer to sell, or import into the United States the patented invention). 
14. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 860-61 
(1998). 
15. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive 
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (1989); Rebecca S. Eisen-
berg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE 
L.J. 177, 222 (1987). 
16. See Note, Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1922 
(1997); Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 
CALIF. L. REV. 1599 (1990). 
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reflection upon the appropriate grasp of the patent system appears 
worthwhile. 
This Article takes as its focus patentable processes as discussed 
in State Street and Excel.  Part I of this Article briefly reviews the 
history of process patents, from early case law under the Statute of 
Monopolies to the more recent tumult concerning computer-
implemented mathematical algorithms.  It then traces the rise of 
patents on computerized business models and their confirmation in 
State Street.  Casting a critical eye towards that opinion, Part I 
concludes that the patent eligibility inquiry has been reduced to 
one of mere utility.  This trend is a disturbing one, for unlike 
breakthroughs in computer or biotechnologies, business methods 
are vastly older than the patent system itself.  Yet only recently 
have we come to understand that such techniques lie within the 
ambit of the patent system. 
In Part II, this Article explores the broad ramifications of the 
State Street and Excel opinions. With the Patent Office open for 
business method applications, few constraints appear to bar the 
grant of patents on other sorts of processes capable of achieving a 
pragmatic result.  Disconnected from particular physical apparatus, 
such patents will set forth not so much technical artifacts, but a 
broad category of proprietary modes of analysis, techniques and 
protocols from disciplines ranging from the social sciences to the 
law.  Yet surely the constitutional directive that patents apply to 
the “Useful Arts,” as well as our long-held sense of the reach of the 
patent system, must somehow cabin the extent of patentable sub-
ject matter.  We have come to this place, this Article reasons, be-
cause of our near-total engagement with the artificial.  Discerning 
the ontic dimension of technology has perplexed not only the 
courts, but epistemologists and the most accomplished of techno-
logical observers as well. 
Resolving to develop an articulation of those aspects of human 
endeavor we may fairly call technological, Part II invokes contem-
porary thought about technology.  Turning to the technological 
commentary of Robert McGinn, Paul W. DeVore and Carl Mit-
cham, this Article develops a typology of traits that distinguish 
technology from other forms of human activity.  This Article con-
cludes that technological activities are concerned with the produc-
THOMASFMT.DOC 9/29/2006  3:28 PM 
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tion or transformation of artifacts through the systematic manipula-
tion of physical forces.  Bounded by interaction with the external 
environment, technological activities expend resources and knowl-
edge in order to fabricate or modify products, or to develop proce-
dural systems for so doing.  Last, technology presents a form of ra-
tional and systematic knowledge, oriented towards efficiency and 
capable of being assessed through objective criteria. 
This Article continues in Part III by considering how we can 
move from a catalogue of characteristics to an essentialist, legally 
apt definition of the technological.  Recent experience concerning 
methods of medical treatment suggests one technique: amendment 
of the Patent Act to create particularized patent-free spheres of ac-
tivity.  This Article concludes that due to the obligations of the 
TRIPS Agreement, the intellectual property component of the 
World Trade Organization treaty, such efforts are unlikely to suc-
ceed.  Given the TRIPS Agreement mandate that patent rights be 
enjoyable without discrimination as to the field of technology, 
even the recent amendment concerning medical methods appears 
suspect.17 
This Article finds a more favorable solution in the standard of 
industrial application.  Long a part of many foreign laws and fully 
compatible with the TRIPS Agreement, the standards developed 
under the industrial application requirement bear a striking resem-
blance to contemporary thought about the scope of technological 
activities.  By restricting patentable advances to the repeatable 
production or transformation of material objects, and excluding 
subject matter founded upon the aesthetic, social observation or 
personal skill, the industrial application requirement would restore 
a sense of patentable subject matter that matches our sensibilities. 
 
 
17.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, re-
printed in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 365 (GATT Secretariat 1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
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I.  THE PATENT ELIGIBILITY OF BUSINESS METHODS 
A.  The Foundational Law of Business Methods 
From its very beginnings the patent system has struggled with 
the patentability of methods.  The forebear of contemporary patent 
legislation, the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623,18 extended 
the possibility of patenting only to “manufactures.”19  Although the 
usual sense of that term suggests human-made artifacts, the ration-
alization of production techniques brought about by the Industrial 
Revolution led courts to entertain a widening conception of pat-
entable subject matter.  By the mid-Nineteenth century the English 
patent system had extended fully to both products and processes.20  
Yet discomfort with the potential scope of process protection re-
mains today. Commonwealth courts that continued to interpret the 
term “manufactures” sought to limit the patent system to so-called 
“manual arts,”21 an “artificially created state of affairs,”22 or the 
production or preservation of vendible products.23 
Seemingly aware of the English experience, the United States 
Congress expressly declared a “useful art” to be within the scope 
of the 1790 Patent Act.24  Section 101 of the current legislation, the 
Patent Act of 1952, extends patentability to “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”25  The 
statute circularly defines the term “process” to mean any “process, 
art or method,” including “a new use of a known process, machine, 
manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”26  Supreme 
 
18. 21 Jam. 1, c. 3 (1623).  See generally Chris R. Kyle, But a New Button to an Old 
Coat: The Enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, 19 J. LEGAL HIST. 203 (1998). 
19. The Statute prohibited the Crown from granting monopolies except “to the true 
and first inventor or inventors” of “any manner of new manufactures, within this 
realme . . . .”  21 Jam. 1, c. 3, § 6. 
20. See Crane v. Price, 134 Eng. Rep. 239 (1842). 
21. See Maeder v. Bush, 59 C.L.R. 684 (1938). 
22. See National Research Dev. Corp.’s Application, [1961] RPC 134 (Austl. 1964). 
23. See Boulton v. Bull, 126 Eng. Rep. 651, 661 (1795). 
24. U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 authorizes Congress “To promote the Progress of 
Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 
25. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
26. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994). 
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Court elaborations of this definition have included “a method of 
doing a thing,”27 “a mode of treatment of certain materials to pro-
duce a given result,”28 and “some practicable method or means of 
producing a beneficial result or effect.”29 
While the United States courts possessed a firmer statutory 
grounding for processes than their common law peers, they too ex-
perienced difficulties in adjudicating disputes involving process 
patents.30  Patented processes are often practiced in secret, with 
only the product of the process available to the public.  The incho-
ate nature of processes makes it difficult to evaluate their impact 
upon the public domain,31 assess whether they have been infringed 
or not,32 and determine how they can be physically marked.33 
But particularly troubling within the sphere of processes is the 
demarcation of the limits of patentable subject matter.  Seemingly 
any sort of communicable technique can be articulated as a series 
of steps and expressed in the style of a patent claim.34  This sense 
is reinforced by the legislative history of the current patent statute, 
which the Supreme Court read as holding “that Congress intended 
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is 
made by man.’”35 
 
27. Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 383 (1909). 
28. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1877). 
29. Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268, 15 How. 252, 268 (1853). 
30. See Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 
963 (1986) (noting the problems encountered in interpreting the meaning of “process”).  
Earlier treatments can be found at Herman Berman, Method Claims, 17 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 713, 789 (1935); William B. Whitney, Patentable Processes, 19 HARV. L. REV. 30 
(1905). 
31. See, e.g., Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 
516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946). 
32. The Process Patents Amendment Act of 1988 is incorporated into the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 , Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§9001-07,102 Sts. 1107, 
1563-67 (1988) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§154,271,287, and 295 (1998)).  See generally 
Eli Lilly & Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1996); W. Bradley 
Haymond, The Process Patent Amendments Act of 1988: Solving An Old Problem, But 
Creating New Ones, 1989 BYU L. REV. 567; Glenn E.J. Murphy, Note, The Process Pat-
ent Amendments Act of 1988, 9 J. L. & COM. 267 (1989). 
33. See, e.g., American Med. Sys., Inc. v. Medical Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523 (Fed. 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1070 (1994).  
34. See Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1033. 
35. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)).  But see 
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Perhaps realizing the expansive grasp of proprietization made 
possible by the patent system, the courts developed sundry doc-
trines to cabin its reach.  Variously expressed as bars to patents on 
business methods,36 as well as such things as “mental steps,” “al-
gorithms,” and “printed matter,” these doctrines purported to hold 
certain subject matter unpatentable per se.37  Chief among these 
limitations was the longstanding sentiment that “[a]n idea of itself 
is not patentable.”38  “While a scientific truth, or the mathematical 
expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and useful 
structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may 
be.”39  Although the policy underpinnings of this restriction were 
never articulated well, the Supreme Court once suggested that such 
abstractions comprised “the basic tools of scientific and techno-
logical work,”40 too central to the process of technological devel-
opment to be appropriable.  Just as the copyright law limits itself to 
protection of expression and permits an author’s ideas to enrich the 
public domain,41 so too did the patent law concern the physical in-
stantiation of technological knowledge rather than that knowledge 
itself. 
The bar on patents directed towards business methods repre-
sented an extension of the prescription on patenting abstract prin-
ciples.  As early as 1868, the Patent Commissioner sensed that “[i]t 
 
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, 
VALIDITY, AND INFRINGEMENT § 1.01 at 5 (Cumulative Supp. June 1999) (“Theoretical or 
abstract discoveries are excluded as are discoveries, however practical and useful, in non-
technological arts, such as the liberal arts, the social sciences, theoretical mathematics, 
and business and management methodology.”); Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 
28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 393-94 (1960) (“Of course, not every kind of an invention 
can be patented.  Invaluable though it may be to individuals, the public, and national de-
fense, the invention of a more effective organization of the materials in, and the tech-
niques of teaching a course in physics, chemistry or Russian is not a patentable inven-
tion . . . .  Also outside that group is one of the greatest inventions of our times, the diaper 
service.”) 
36. See generally E. Robert Yoches & Howard G. Pollock, Is the “Method of Doing 
Business” Rejection Bankrupt?, 3 FED. CIR. B.J. 73 (Spring 1993); Geo. E. Tew, Method 
of Doing Business, 16 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 607 (1934). 
37. See Chisum, supra note 30 at 964-71. 
38. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874). 
39. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). 
40. Gottchalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). 
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is contrary to the spirit of the law . . . to grant patents for methods 
of book-keeping.”42  Nineteenth century courts also opined that “a 
method of transacting common business”43 or “a mere contract”44 
were unpatentable.  Yet it was not until the Second Circuit’s 1908 
opinion in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.45 that the 
proscription on business method patents was secured in the trea-
tises.46 
The patent at issue in Hotel Security Checking concerned a 
“method of and means for cash-registering and account-checking” 
designed to prevent fraud by waiters and cashiers.47  The system 
employed certain forms that tracked sales and ensured that waiters 
submitted appropriate funds at the close of business.  The Second 
Circuit invalidated the patent on the basis of prior knowledge, find-
ing that the patented technology “would occur to anyone conver-
sant with the business.”48  However, the court further observed 
that: 
It is manifest that the subject-matter of the claims is not a 
machine, manufacture or composition of matter.  If within 
the language of the statute at all, it must be as a “new and 
useful art.”  One of the definitions given by Webster of the 
word “art” is as follows: “The employment of means to ac-
complish some desired end; the adaptation of things in the 
natural world to the uses of life; the application of knowl-
edge or power to practical purposes.”  In the sense of the 
patent law, an art is not a mere abstraction.  A system of 
transacting business disconnected from the means of carry-
ing out the system is not, within the most liberal interpreta-
 
42. Ex parte Abraham, 1868 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 59. 
43. United States Credit Sys. Co. v. American Credit Indemnity Co., 53 F. 818, 819 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893). 
44. In re Moeser, 27 App. D.C. 307, 310 (1906). 
45. 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). 
46. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1376 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that Hotel Security Checking is “the case frequently cited 
as establishing the business method exception to statutory subject matter”); Rinaldo Del 
Gallo, III, Are “Methods of Doing Business” Finally Out of Business as a Statutory Re-
jection?, 38 IDEA 403, 405 (1998).  
47. 160 F. at 467. 
48. Id. at 471. 
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tion of the term, an art.49 
To similar effect had been the earlier statement of the Commis-
sioner in Ex parte Turner, which held that “a plan or theory of ac-
tion which, if carried into practice, could produce no physical re-
sults proceeding direct[ly] from the operation of the theory or plan 
itself is not an art within the meaning of the patent laws.”50  Thus 
both court and Patent Office hinged the patentability of processes 
upon the presence of a “physical tangible facility” for practicing 
the patented technique.51  Importantly, both tribunals also held that 
mere “printed matter”—information inscribed upon a substrate for 
purposes of presentation—would not suffice to fulfill the require-
ment.  Only a physical structure exhibiting a functional relation-
ship between the substrate and written material would enter the 
realm of the patentable.52 
Numerous decisions applied this standard while denying pat-
ents on business-oriented inventions.  Citing a lack of physical 
structure other than printed matter, the courts struck down patents 
claiming a method for transferring writings from manuscript form 
to printed publication form;53 a system of blank checks and stubs 
useful in a combined checking/savings account;54 and a system for 
national coordination of firefighting efforts.55  Some patents were 
upheld: a railway ticket consisting of a base and separable attach-
ment was held not to “relat[e] merely to ‘a method of transacting 
business,’” but to involve a unique physical structure.56 
The requirement of physical instantiation is not an illogical 
one.  It ties the relatively abstract proprietary interests created by 
the patent law to the corporeal things that form the traditional ob-
jects of property.  The identifiable boundaries that result better en-
 
49. Id. at 469. 
50. 1894 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 36, 37-38. 
51. Rand, McNally & Co. v. Exchange Scrip-Book Co., 187 F. 984, 986 (7th Cir. 
1911). 
52. See In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (CCPA 1969); In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007 
(CCPA 1967); Morton C. Jacobs, Editorial Note, The Patentability of Printed Matter: 
Critique and Proposal, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475 (1950). 
53. In re Bolongaro, 62 F.2d 1059 (CCPA 1933). 
54. In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910 (CCPA 1934). 
55. In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324 (CCPA 1942). 
56. Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443, 446 (6th Cir. 1913). 
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able individuals to complete transactions, form markets and deter-
mine the sorts of conduct that will be judged permissible.  The 
stricture that processes generate embodied results also places ap-
propriate limits upon infringement liability, for the courts may far 
more readily observe the market impact of manipulated objects 
than trace the effect of more rarefied teachings.  In all these mat-
ters the patent law reflected the precepts of the copyright law, 
which offers protection only to works fixed in a tangible medium 
of expression.57 
 
B.  Computer-Implemented Methods 
The demand for physical structure proved a serviceable patent 
eligibility standard for most of the history of the patent system.  
But the rise of computer technology would sorely test whether the 
presence of physical structure was a useful discriminant between 
those processes which could be patented and that which could not.  
Applicants in the computer arts urged that electronic circuits and 
the software to command them were as industrial in character as 
more traditional technologies.  But examiners initially cast an ex-
tremely wary eye at their applications.  They recognized that much 
of the precedent exempting abstract ideas from the patent system 
would be swept away by allowing patents on computers pro-
grammed to perform newly invented mathematical algorithms.58 
 
57. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (1994); See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the 
Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement The-
ory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1380-82 (1989). 
58. The bookshelves groan under the weight of numerous articles discussing the 
early interaction between computer technologies and the patent system, as well as the 
subsequent debate over the patenting of computer-related inventions.  More recent publi-
cations on this topic include: Brian Richard Yoshida, Claiming Electronic and Software 
Technologies: the Effect of the Federal Circuit Decisions in Alappat, Warmerdam, and 
Lowry on the Claiming of Mathematical Algorithms and Data Structures, 45 BUFF. L. 
REV. 457 (1997); Stephen G. Kunin,  Patentability of Computer Related Inventions in the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office, 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 833 
(1995); Maximilian R. Peterson, Note, Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Was It a Pat-
entable Machine or an Unpatentable “Algorithm”?  On Principle and Expediency in 
Current Patent Law Doctrines Relating to Computer-Implemented Inventions, 64 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 90 (1995); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal 
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994). 
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The Supreme Court entered this debate when it granted certio-
rari in Gottschalk v. Benson in 1972.59  There the applicant claimed 
a method of converting numerals from binary-coded decimal to 
pure binary format.  The steps of the method comprised mathe-
matical operations that shuffled a sequence of bits in order to ex-
press appropriately a particular number.  The application contained 
claims both reciting the method as performed by a computer, and 
the abstract performance of the method without regard to any par-
ticular physical means.  The method had broad application in data 
processing tasks, ranging from “the operation of a train to verifica-
tion of drivers’ licenses to researching [the] law books” in the 
words of the Court.60 
In a cryptic opinion, the Court upheld the Patent Office’s rejec-
tion of the application.  The Court first recited the traditional re-
quirement that patentability hinged upon the “[t]ransformation and 
reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing.’”61  Arguably, 
at least those claims reciting computer implementation of the nu-
merical conversion method did involve some sort of physical con-
version.  Operation of the computer would not only manipulate 
those electrical signals representing the data, but generate electrical 
signals in order to instruct the computer to perform certain tasks.  
Yet the Court found this hardware insufficient, drawing its analysis 
to a close with a self-styled “nutshell”: 
It is conceded that one may not patent an idea.  But in prac-
tical effect that would be the result if the formula for con-
verting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals were pat-
ented in this case.  The mathematical formula involved here 
has no substantial practical application except in connec-
tion with a digital computer, which means that if the judg-
ment below is affirmed, the patent would wholly pre-empt 
the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a 
patent on the algorithm itself.62 
Thus the Court held that computerization of mathematical 
 
59. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
60. Id. at 68. 
61. Id. at 70. 
62. Id. at 71-72. 
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equations could not shift them from the realm of ideas to that of 
industry.  Internal circuitry operations were not enough to uphold 
even those claims reciting computer hardware, for barring the 
presence of an idiot savant or enormous mechanical computer to 
perform the claimed conversions rapidly, a digital computer pre-
sented the only context in which the equations had meaning.  The 
digital computer amounted only to “nominal apparatus” that placed 
no meaningful limitations upon the scope of the claims.63 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had numerous op-
portunities to follow the lead of the Supreme Court.  In In re Mau-
corps,64  the applicant had claimed a “computing system for proc-
essing data” that determined the optimum number of sales 
representatives for a given organization as well as the number of 
times they should visit customers over a period of time.65  The in-
vention consisted of various formulae that Maucorps had derived 
from sales experience and implemented via software written in the 
Fortran programming language.  The court affirmed the rejection 
of the application, reasoning that the “claimed invention as a whole 
comprises each and every means for carrying out a solution tech-
nique for a set of equations wherein one number is computed from 
a set of numbers.”66 
In re Meyer67 was to similar effect.  Meyer’s application de-
scribed a computer-based expert system for aiding a neurologist in 
diagnosing patients.  His claims were drafted broadly, calling for a 
more generalized “process for indentifying [sic] locations of prob-
able malfunction in a complex system.”68  In essence Meyer called 
for test data to be accumulated and conclusions reached in accor-
dance with statistical formulae.  The court again affirmed the rejec-
tion of the application, quoting with approval the Patent Office’s 
conclusion that the “process recited is an attempt to patent a 
mathematical algorithm rather than a process for producing a 
 
63. See Richard H. Stern, Tales from the Algorithm War: Benson to Iwahashi, It’s 
Deja Vu All Over Again, 18 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 371 (1991). 
64. 609 F.2d 481 (CCPA 1979). 
 65.   Id. at 482. 
66. Id. at 486. 
67. 688 F.2d 789 (CCPA 1982). 
68. Id. at 792. 
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product.”69 
This early resistance to patents on computer-related inventions 
faded over time, however.  By the early 1980’s, Patent Office ex-
aminers found more favor in computer-related inventions, and the 
courts seemed more willing to uphold the issued patents.70  While 
the omnipresence of computer technology and its significance to 
the United States economy may have carried the day, one suspects 
that both the Patent Office and courts grew weary of the relentless 
argumentation of a bar that has scant motivation to favor restraints 
upon the scope of patenting.  Also influential was the 1980 opinion 
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,71 a Supreme Court decision that 
opened the patent system to biotechnology. 
That opinion involved the Patent Office rejection of Dr. An-
anda Chakrabarty’s application claiming an artificially generated 
microorganism.  At the Supreme Court, chief among the arguments 
of the Patent Office Solicitor was that because genetic technology 
could not have been foreseen at the time the patent statute was 
drafted, the resolution of the patentability of such inventions 
should be left to Congress.  En route to reversing the Patent Office 
decision, the Court disagreed: “A rule that unanticipated inventions 
are without protection would conflict with the core concept of the 
patent law that anticipation undermines patentability.”72 
The difficulty with this reasoning is that it mixes two logical 
classes, that of individual technologies with the entire domain of 
invention.  As neatly illustrated by Bertrand Russell in his famous 
debate with Father Copleston, the fact that every person has a 
mother does not lead to the conclusion that the human race as a 
whole must have a mother.73  And simply because the patent stat-
ute in part judges patentability through an anticipation standard 
hardly suggests that we lack other principles to govern the extent 
of patentable subject matter. 
 
69. Id. at 794. 
70. See, e.g., In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689 (CCPA 1977); In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 
152 (CCPA 1976). 
71. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
72. Id. at 316. 
73. See Bertrand Russell & F.C. Copleston, A Debate on the Existence of God, re-
printed in BERTRAND RUSSELL ON GOD AND RELIGION 123, 131 (Al Seckel ed., 1986).  
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However apparent the weaknesses of this aspect of Chakra-
barty, the Supreme Court leaned heavily upon its reasoning in its 
1981 opinion in Diamond v. Diehr.74  The Diehr applicants 
claimed a process for operating a rubber-molding press with the 
aid of a digital computer.  Their computer continuously monitored 
the temperature within a press and employed the well-known Ar-
rhenius equation to calculate the amount of time required to cure 
rubber placed within the press.  When the computer calculated that 
the elapsed time equaled the actual molding time, it signaled a de-
vice to open the press.75 
At the Patent Office, the examiner considered that the process 
steps that were implemented in computer software were nonstatu-
tory.  The examiner further reasoned that the “remaining steps—
installing rubber in the press and the subsequent closing of the 
press—were ‘conventional and necessary to the process and cannot 
be the basis of patentability.’”76  The Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals reversed the rejection, however.  Following a grant of cer-
tiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed.77  Relying upon Chakrabarty, 
the Court explained that the applicants: 
do not seek to patent a mathematical formula.  Instead, they 
seek patent protection for a process of curing synthetic rub-
ber.  Their process admittedly employs a well-known 
mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-empt the 
use of that equation.  Rather, they seek only to foreclose 
from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all 
of the other steps in their claimed process.  These include 
installing rubber in a press, closing the mold, constantly de-
termining the temperature of the mold, constantly recalcu-
lating the appropriate cure time through the use of the for-
mula and a digital computer, and automatically opening the 
press at the proper time.78 
A number of difficulties attend the Diehr Court’s analysis as 
 
74. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
75. Id. at 177-78. 
76. Id. at 180-81. 
 77.  Chakrabarty, 450 U.S. at 193. 
78. Id. at 187. 
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well.  The advancement offered by the Diehr applicants consisted 
of mathematical computations.  The physical steps on which so 
much depended—reading a thermometer and signaling a press 
door to open—were trite.  Allowing patentability to hinge upon the 
minimal recitation of these steps within the claims seems un-
founded, for they merely stated the only valid technical context in 
which the mathematics would operate.  They did not present mean-
ingful limitations upon the scope of the claims.  To the extent that 
the prohibition against patenting ideas presents sound policy, al-
lowing applicants to avoid these limitations through artful claim 
drafting appears unwise. 
The patent bar nonetheless proved attentive to the lessons of 
Diehr.  Technologists proved increasingly adept at claiming newly 
formulated mathematical equations alongside some sort of physical 
manifestation.  In response the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals formed the two-part Freeman-Walter-Abele test.  Initiated in 
1978 by the In re Freeman79 decision, the court refined the test in 
the 1980 opinion In re Walter.80  Following the Supreme Court’s 
issuance of its Diehr decision,81 the court once again modified the 
standard in its 1982 decision In re Abele.82  As  the Federal Circuit 
later described: 
It is first determined whether a mathematical algorithm is 
recited directly or indirectly in the claim.  If so, it is next 
determined whether the claimed invention as a whole is no 
more than the algorithm itself; that is, whether the claim is 
directed to a mathematical algorithm that is not applied to 
or limited by physical elements or process steps.  Such 
claims are nonstatutory.  However, when the mathematical 
algorithm is applied in one or more steps of an otherwise 
statutory process claim, or one or more elements of an oth-
erwise statutory apparatus claim, the requirements of sec-
tion 101 are met.83 
 
79. 573 F.2d 1237 (CCPA 1978). 
80. 618 F.2d 758 (CCPA 1980). 
81. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
82. 684 F.2d 902 (CCPA 1982). 
83. Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 
1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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The Federal Circuit employed the Freeman-Walter-Abele test 
both to reject84 and allow85 various applications as patentable sub-
ject matter.  But its decisions demonstrated an increasingly permis-
sive tenor, and a glance through the Patent Office Gazette showed 
a growing number of issued patents directed towards computer-
related inventions. 
Emboldened by this state of affairs,86 applicants eventually 
abandoned even the pretext of tying the mathematics to a tradition-
ally industrial process such as curing rubber.  Instead the tangible 
thing upon which patentability was keyed was the combination of a 
computer and the software-driven electrical signals employed to 
instruct it.  Because general purpose computers could be conceived 
as special purpose computers once instructed by software, virtually 
any fragment of software code could be viewed as statutory subject 
matter.87 
Although this reasoning had been impliedly rejected in Ben-
son,88 it met with great success in the Federal Circuit’s en banc de-
cision in In re Alappat.89  There, the court considered a claimed 
apparatus useful for generating smooth and continuous lines for 
display on an oscilloscope.  Alappat’s invention completed various 
mathematical computations in order to convert so-called “vector 
list data” into “pixel illumination intensity data”; that is, it con-
verted one set of numbers into another set of numbers.90  The ma-
jority held that the claimed invention comprised statutory subject 
matter: 
Although many, or arguably even all, of the means ele-
 
84. In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
85. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
86. See Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d 1053; Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370.  But see In re Grams, 
888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
87. This argument was successful in In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (CCPA 
1969).  See also In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1403 n.29 (CCPA 1969). 
 88.   Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
89. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  See also John A. Burtis, Comment, Towards a 
Rational Jurisprudence of Computer-Related Patentability in Light of In re Alappat, 79 
MINN. L. REV. 1129 (1995); Sang Hui Michael Kim, In re Alappat: A Strict Statutory In-
terpretation Determining Patentable Subject Matter Relating to Computer Software?, 13 
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 635 (1995); W. Wayt King, Jr., Recent Develop-
ment, The Soul of the Virtual Machine: In re Alappat, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 575 (1995). 
90. 33 F.3d at 1537-39. 
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ments recited in claim 15 represent circuitry elements that 
perform mathematical calculations, which is essentially 
true of all digital electrical circuits, the claimed invention 
as a whole is directed to a combination of interrelated ele-
ments which combine to form a machine for converting 
discrete waveform data samples into anti-aliased pixel il-
lumination intensity data to be displayed on a display 
means.  This is not a disembodied mathematical concept 
which may be characterized as an “abstract idea,” but rather 
a specific machine to produce a useful, concrete, and tangi-
ble result.91 
The en banc court also quickly distinguished Maucorps92 and 
Meyer.93  According to the court, “Maucorps dealt with a business 
methodology for deciding how salesmen should best handle re-
spective customers and Meyer involved a ‘system’ for aiding a 
neurologist in diagnosing patients.  Clearly, neither of the alleged 
‘inventions’ in those cases falls within any § 101 category.”94 
Reconciliation of Alappat with Benson appears difficult.  Both 
inventions concerned data transformations performed by a com-
puter using mathematical calculations.  Yet, according to the Fed-
eral Circuit, the Benson Court had instead attempted to express the 
concept that “certain types of mathematical subject matter, stand-
ing alone, represent nothing more than abstract ideas until reduced 
to some type of practical application, and thus that subject matter is 
not, in and of itself, entitled to patent protection.”95  That the appli-
cant in Benson could have circumvented the Supreme Court’s ob-
jection simply by naming one practical application for his algo-
rithm seems quite implausible, particularly since the Court took 
pains to catalogue some of the many uses of that algorithm in its 
opinion.96 
After Alappat, the long-running saga concerning the patentabil-
ity of computer-related inventions seemed of little more than his-
 
91. Id. at 1544 (footnotes omitted). 
92. 609 F.2d 481; see supra text accompanying notes 64-66. 
93. 688 F.2d 789; see supra text accompanying notes 67-68.  
94. 33 F.3d at 1541. 
95. Id. at 1543 (footnote omitted). 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62. 
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torical interest.  Seemingly any applicant who drafted patent claims 
within the strictures of the vitiated physicality standard could ob-
tain a patent on nearly any data processing technique.  That the ad-
vance was found not in computer circuitry or programming tech-
niques was besides the point; so long as the technique could be 
performed by a computer and was so characterized, then a patent 
could issue. 
Given that many such techniques are only practically realizable 
when performed on a computer, this minimal stricture was one 
many applicants could live with.  Yet few failed to realize that the 
artful claims drafting inspired by Diehr and Alappat comprised lit-
tle more than a charade.97  Although a robust physical transforma-
tion requirement was itself quite defensible, its hobbled remnant 
proved so provocative of contorted claims drafting that it appears 
scarcely worth maintaining.98  Some jurists seemed willing to 
abandon the requirement of physicality in favor of a more expan-
sive vision of patentability, as suggested by Judge Newman’s view 
in a 1994 dissent that: 
[A] statutory “process” is limited only in that it must be 
technologically useful.  . . . All mathematical algorithms 
transform data, and thus serve as a process to convert initial 
conditions or inputs into solutions or outputs, through 
transformation of information. . . . The test is simply 
whether the mathematical formula or equation is all that is 
claimed, or whether the procedures involving the specified 
mathematics are part of a useful process.  When the latter 
requirement is met the subject matter is statutory.99 
Only four years would elapse before a view of statutory subject 
matter that embraced the “transformation of information” would 
make its way from the dissent to the majority.  The occasion was 
the inevitable resolution of the conflict between the venerable case 
law on business methods and more recent developments on com-
puter-related inventions, the Federal Circuit decision in State Street 
 
97. See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1564 (Archer, C.J., dissenting). 
98. See John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, And The Tangible: Drafting Patent 
Claims Around Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219 (1998). 
99. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
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Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.100 
C.  Computer-Implemented Business Methods 
Signature Financial Group held the patent at suit.101  Directed 
to a “Data Processing System for Hub and Spoke Financial Ser-
vices Configuration,” it described a data processing system for im-
plementing an investment structure known as a “Hub and Spoke” 
system.  This system allowed individual mutual funds (Spokes) to 
pool their assets in an investment portfolio (Hub) organized as a 
partnership. According to the patent, this investment regime pro-
vided the advantageous combination of economies of scale in ad-
ministering investments coupled with the tax advantages of a part-
nership.102 
Maintaining a proper accounting of this sophisticated financial 
structure proved difficult.  Indeed, due to “the complexity of the 
 
100. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  Also of note was the district court opinion in 
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
564 F. Supp. 1358, 1364, 1369 (D. Del. 1983) (holding that Merrill Lynch’s claimed 
“system for processing and supervising a plurality of composite subscriber [investment] 
accounts” comprised “statutory subject matter because the claims allegedly teach a 
method of operation on a computer to effectuate a business activity”).  Paine, Webber is 
discussed in Samuelson, supra note 12, at 1120-21. 
101. United States Patent No. 5,193,056 (March 9, 1993).  The first claim of the 
‘056 patent provided: 
1. A data processing system for managing a financial services configuration of 
a portfolio established as a partnership, each partner being one of a plurality of 
funds, comprising:  
   (a) computer processor means for processing data;  
 (b) storage means for storing data on a storage medium;  
   (c) first means for initializing the storage medium;  
   (d) second means for processing data regarding assets in the portfolio and 
each of the funds from a previous day and data regarding increases or decreases 
in each of the funds, [sic, funds’] assets and for allocating the percentage share 
that each fund holds in the portfolio;  
   (e) third means for processing data regarding daily incremental income, ex-
penses, and net realized gain or loss for the portfolio and for allocating such 
data among each fund;  
   (f) fourth means for processing data regarding daily net unrealized gain or 
loss for the portfolio and for allocating such data among each fund; and  
   (g) fifth means for processing data regarding aggregate year-end income, ex-
penses, and capital gain or loss for the portfolio and each of the funds. 
Id. 
102. 149 F.3d at 1370. 
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calculations, a computer or equivalent device is a virtual necessity 
to perform the task.”103  Signature’s patented system purported to 
allow administrators to “monitor and record the financial informa-
tion flow and make all calculations necessary for maintaining a 
partner fund financial services configuration.”104  In addition it 
tracked “all the relevant data determined on a daily basis for the 
Hub and each Spoke, so that aggregate year end income, expenses, 
and capital gain or loss can be determined for accounting and for 
tax purposes for the Hub and, as a result, for each publicly traded 
Spoke.”105  Crucially, Signature’s invention marked no advance in 
computer technology or mathematical calculations.  The basis for 
patentability was the uniqueness of the investment package Signa-
ture claimed in its patent. 
Following issuance of the patent, Signature entered into licens-
ing negotiations with a competitor, State Street Bank, that ulti-
mately proved unsuccessful.  State Street then brought a declara-
tory judgment action against Signature, seeking the invalidity of 
the patent.  The district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of State Street under two alternative grounds.106  First, the court 
applied the Freeman-Walter-Abele test,107 concluding that: 
At bottom, the invention is an accounting system for a cer-
tain type of financial investment vehicle claimed as means 
for performing a series of mathematical functions. Quite 
simply, it involves no further physical transformation or re-
duction than inputting numbers, calculating numbers, out-
putting numbers, and storing numbers. The same functions 
could be performed, albeit less efficiently, by an accountant 
armed with pencil, paper, calculator, and a filing system.108 
The court then buttressed its holding by turning to “the 
long-established principle that business ‘plans’ and ‘systems’ are 
 
103. Id. at 1371. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. State Street Bank and Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502 
(D. Mass. 1996). 
107. Id. at 512-15. 
108. Id. at 515. 
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not patentable.”109  The court judged that “patenting an accounting 
system necessary to carry on a certain type of business is tanta-
mount to a patent on the business itself. Because such abstract 
ideas are not patentable, either as methods of doing business or as 
mathematical algorithms,” the patent was held invalid.110 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed in a magisterial opin-
ion.  Writing for a three-judge panel, Judge Rich found the patent 
claimed not an abstract idea but a programmed machine that pro-
duced a “useful, concrete, and tangible result.”111  “This renders it 
statutory subject matter, even if the useful result is expressed in 
numbers, such as price, profit, percentage, cost, or loss.”112  Ac-
cording to the court, “[t]he question of whether a claim encom-
passes statutory subject matter should not focus on which of the 
four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to—process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter—but rather on the 
essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its prac-
tical utility.”113  The court further trumpeted that: 
Today, we hold that the transformation of data, represent-
ing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series 
of mathematical calculations into a final share price, consti-
tutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, 
formula, or calculation, because it produces “a useful, con-
crete and tangible result”—a final share price momentarily 
fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even ac-
cepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in sub-
sequent trades.114 
The Federal Circuit then turned to the district court’s business 
methods rejection, opting to “take [the] opportunity to lay this ill-
conceived exception to rest.”115  According to Judge Rich, restric-
tions upon patents for methods of doing business were ill-
conceived from the start and no longer the law under the 1952 Pat-
 
109. Id. (citation omitted). 
110. Id. at 516. 
111. 149 F.3d at 1373 (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
112. Id. at 1375. 
113. Id. at 1375 (footnote omitted). 
114. Id. at 1373. 
115. Id. at 1375. 
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ent Act.  Following issuance of the State Street opinion, methods 
of doing business were to be subject only to the same patentability 
analysis as any other sort of process.116 
State Street is a curious opinion on a number of fronts.  First, 
the court’s characterization of the patented invention as generating 
a “final share price” appears inaccurate.117  Neither the term “final 
share price” nor its reasonable approximation appears in any of 
Signature’s claims, which are instead directed towards the process-
ing of data relating to portfolio income, expenses and net gain or 
loss.118  This interpretation seems especially odd in light of an ear-
lier opinion by Judge Rich, In re Iwahashi,119 which admonished 
that the precedents have “held some claims statutory and other 
claims nonstatutory, depending entirely on what they said.  We 
have to do the same here.”120 
The State Street court also squarely stated that the district court 
had erred by applying the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.  According 
to the court, “[a]fter Diehr and Chakrabarty, the Free-
man-Walter-Abele test has little, if any, applicability to determin-
ing the presence of statutory subject matter.”121  As a matter of 
chronology this statement is plainly false: the Supreme Court is-
sued Chakrabarty in 1980 and Diehr in 1981.122  The Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals authored Abele in 1982.123 
This aberrant reinterpretation of Diehr and Chakrabarty also 
does a disservice to any number of Federal Circuit opinions which 
applied the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in patent eligibility deter-
minations.124  It further seems to misread Chakrabarty.  There 
the Court relied on Parker v. Flook, which expressly stated that a 
“claim for an improved method of calculation, even when tied to a 
specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter under § 101.”125  
 
116. Id.  
117. See supra text accompanying note 102. 
118. See supra text accompanying note 101. 
119. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
120. Id. at 1374.  For more on Iwahashi, see Thomas, supra note 98, at 258-59. 
121. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375. 
122. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text. 
123. 684 F.2d 902 (CCPA 1982). 
124. E.g., Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1053; Grams, 888 F.2d at 835. 
125. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 n.18 (1978).  
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This standard appears to provide ample basis for striking down 
Signature’s claimed “system,” which does nothing more than 
maintain the accounting books for a particular financial product. 
As well, the Federal Circuit failed to acknowledge fully Mau-
corps126 and Meyer,127 as well as the manner in which those cases 
had been treated in Alappat.128  Each of those opinions rejected 
claims quite analogous to those of Signature Financial Group’s 
patent.129  The State Street court dismissed this precedent quickly, 
stating only that “closer scrutiny of these cases reveals that the 
claimed inventions in both Maucorps and Meyer were rejected as 
abstract ideas under the mathematical algorithm exception, not the 
business method exception.”130  But this distinction tells us only 
that the district court’s first basis for invalidating Signature’s pat-
ent should have stood.  It also fails to inform us why the statement 
of the en banc court in Alappat that “a business methodology” 
does not fulfill the strictures of § 101 is no longer the law.131 
In perhaps the most telling line of the opinion, the State 
Street Court further told us that the key inquiry concerning statu-
tory subject matter involves “the essential characteristics of the 
subject matter, in particular, its practical utility.”132  This remark 
appears to collapse the subject matter inquiry into another pat-
entability requisite, that of utility.  The utility standard has always 
been a minimal one, requiring only that the invention confer a 
“specific benefit . . . in currently available form.”133  The difficulty 
with this approach is that, since the early Nineteenth Century, the 
utility standard has been understood to present a distinct, additional 
hurdle to patentability.134  Not only does this dramatic reinterpreta-
 
126. 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
127. 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
128. 33 F.3d 1526, 1540-41. 
129. See supra  text accompanying notes 64-69. 
130. 149 F.3d at 1376. 
131. 33 F.3d at 1541; see supra text accompanying notes 89-91. 
132. 149 F.3d at 1375. 
133. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).  See also In re Brana, 51 
F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Andrew T. Kight , Note, Pregnant with Ambiguity: Credibil-
ity and the PTO Utility Guidelines in Light of Brenner, 73 IND. L.J. 997 (1998); Michelle 
L. Johnson, In re Brana and the Utility Examination Guidelines: A Light at the End of the 
Tunnel?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 285 (1996). 
134. See Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C. Mass. 1817)(No. 8,568); Bedford 
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tion of § 101 seem to relegate that statute’s recitation of categories 
of patentable subject matter into little more than claim formatting 
protocols,135 it also presents an extremely vitiated gatekeeper to the 
patent system.136 
At bottom, the Federal Circuit also said vastly more than it 
needed to with regard to methods of doing business.  The claims of 
the Signature patent were not directed to methods at all, but to 
computer hardware programmed to perform certain calculations.137  
In fact, the court noted that the patent application as filed originally 
included method claims.  But the applicant had abandoned them 
following examiner concerns over patentable subject matter.138  
Given the absence of method claims in the patent at suit, not due to 
happenstance but because of their knowing deletion by the appli-
cant, this portion of the State Street opinion seemed nothing more 
than dicta.  The weight accorded to this discussion would prove 
considerable, however, as the Federal Circuit demonstrated in its 
next significant patent eligibility case. 
D.  Beyond State Street: AT&T v. Excel Communications 
The appeal in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications Inc.139 
arose from AT&T’s efforts to enforce its ‘184 patent, which was 
directed towards the composition of billing records used in tele-
phone networks.140  The ‘184 patent expressly claimed a method 
 
v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217). 
135. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
136. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic 
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 811-12 (1988) (noting that the utility 
requirement has “devolved over the years into a rather minimal obstacle to obtaining a 
patent.”). 
137. 149 F.3d at 1371-72. 
138. 149 F.3d at 1371. 
139. 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
140. Claim 1 of the ‘184 patent recited: 
A method for use in a telecommunications system in which interexchange calls 
initiated by each subscriber are automatically routed over the facilities of a par-
ticular one of a plurality of interexchange carriers associated with that sub-
scriber, said method comprising the steps of: 
generating a message record for an interexchange call between an originating 
subscriber and a terminating subscriber, and 
including, in said message record, a primary interexchange carrier (PIC) indica-
tor having a value which is a function of whether or not the interexchange car-
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for a phone company to determine whether both the caller and the 
recipient of a long-distance telephone subscribed to the company’s 
network.  If so, the phone company could provide a different bill-
ing treatment to such calls, most likely discounting the fee in order 
to encourage both individuals to subscribe to the same phone com-
pany. 
The invention relied upon the fact that when a customer makes 
a long-distance telephone call, the telephone network contempora-
neously maintains billing records.  These records include such in-
formation as the originating and terminating telephone numbers, as 
well as the length of the call.  Also associated with the call is data 
indicating an individual’s chosen “primary interexchange carrier,” 
or long-distance service provider. 
The claimed invention called for the addition of a discrete item 
of data, termed the “PIC indicator,” to the billing record.  The 
value of the PIC indicator was determined by applying the logical 
AND function to the data identifying the primary interexchange 
carriers of the originator and recipient of the long-distance call.  If 
both customers have subscribed to the same phone company, the 
PIC indicator is set to a logical “one.”  Otherwise the PIC indicator 
remains at the value of “zero.”  The  phone company may then 
readily apply its discounted rate to any call where the PIC indicator 
is set to one, without more extensive data processing at the time of 
billing. 
In an opinion issued prior to the release of State Street, the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware held that 
the claimed invention was without § 101.141  Judge Robinson de-
scribed the ‘184 patent as “claiming an invention whereby certain 
information that is already known within a telecommunications 
system (the PICs of the originating and terminating subscribers) is 
simply retrieved for an allegedly new use in billing.”142  With this 
sense of the claimed invention, the court held that “a change in the 
 
rier associated with said terminating subscriber is a predetermined one of said 
interexchange carriers. 
172 F.3d at 1354. 
141. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5346 (Cov. A. 
96-434-SLR) (D. Del. March 27, 1998), rev’d, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
142. Id. at *20. 
THOMASFMT.DOC 9/29/2006  3:28 PM 
1999] THE POST-INDUSTRIAL PATENT SYSTEM 29 
data’s format should not serve to convert nonpatentable subject 
matter into patentable subject matter.”143 
Following an appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed.  Writing for 
a three-judge panel, Judge Plager had little trouble finding that the 
asserted claims “comfortably” fell within the scope of patentable 
subject matter.144  The Federal Circuit quickly disposed of Excel’s 
argument that because AT&T’s claims did not recite a physical 
transformation, they were not patentable subject matter.  Judge 
Plager reasoned that physical transformation was not an absolute 
requisite for patentability, but merely one way of determining 
whether the patented invention achieved a “useful, concrete, tangi-
ble result.”145  Because AT&T’s claimed process produced “a 
number which had a specific meaning,” it could be employed in a 
discrete setting and was therefore patentable.146 
In working this abrupt end to the physical transformation stan-
dard, long understood as the touchstone of patentability of method 
claims, the Federal Circuit distinguished an impressive number of 
earlier decisions.  In particular, the court continued to toss fuel 
upon the funeral pyre of Freeman-Walter-Abele.  “Whatever may 
be left” of the Freeman-Walter-Abele standard was not of value 
here, according to the court, because Diehr and Charkrabarty had 
not required that a process manipulate physical elements to be pat-
entable.147  The Excel court too did not address the unusual timing 
demanded by this reasoning, nor did it seem to have reviewed the 
text of the Chakrabarty opinion.  Three more recent Federal Cir-
cuit opinions suggesting that AT&T’s claims were unpatentable 
were distinguished or deemed “unhelpful.”148 
In closing the opinion, the Federal Circuit was quick to note 
that it had only addressed the subject of patent eligibility, and that 
“the ultimate validity of these claims depends upon satisfying the 
other requirements for patentability such as those set forth in 35 
 
143. Id. at *22. 
 144.   172 F.3d at 1361. 
 145.   Id. at 1357 (quoting State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373). 
 146.   Id. at 1359 (citing Arrythmia, 958 F.3d at 1060). 
 147.   Id. at 1359. 
 148.   Id. (discussing In re Grams, 885 F.2d 835; In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 794; In re 
Wamerdam, 33 F.3d 1354).  
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U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, and 112.”149  Yet the claims at issue in these 
two opinions call into question the extent that § 103, the provision 
demanding the nonobviousness of patented inventions, and § 112, 
a statute that in part requires the drafting of definite claims, are be-
ing enforced.  In Excel, one wonders why a skilled artisan would 
not have found obvious the use of the logical AND standard to the 
data representing the primary interexchange carrier. 
The claims at issue in State Street also appear deficient.  By 
merely reciting a menu of available data operations, each of Signa-
ture’s claims presents no more than an unpatentable aggregation.  
Such claims fail to state how the various claimed means elements 
interact with each other, either functionally or structurally.  The 
case law has interpreted § 112 to demand a showing of the rela-
tionship among the elements of Signature’s inventions, perhaps 
through the recitation of a data bus wired to various hardware ca-
pable of performing the claimed functions.150  That Signature’s 
claims do not comply with § 112 seems particularly troubling, for 
if a claim is not presented in a manner cognizable to the patent law, 
then it would seem difficult to determine whether that subject mat-
ter complies with § 101 or not. 
Despite these weaknesses in the State Street and Excel opin-
ions, each issue of the Patent Office Gazette appears to have taken 
these two opinions into account.  As but one example of recent 
Patent Office work product, consider the following claim: 
A method for remodeling an existing building, said method 
comprising: 
cataloging design ideas that utilize predetermined building 
products; 
 
 149.   Id. at 1361. 
150. See ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 645 (noting this familiar requirement of 
claims drafting).  See In re Worrest, 201 F.2d 930, 934 (CCPA 1953) (The court defined 
an unpatentable aggregation as “a device having two or more unrelated, independent 
units or elements, each of which performs its function separately, uninfluenced by and 
indifferent to the action of the other units. There is no essential or inherent correlation, or 
cooperation, or coordination of elements which mutually contribute to a common purpose 
or result, other than mere convenience due to juxtaposition or collection of the units in a 
common setting.”). 
THOMASFMT.DOC 9/29/2006  3:28 PM 
1999] THE POST-INDUSTRIAL PATENT SYSTEM 31 
presenting the design ideas to a client; 
allowing the client to select a design idea . . . ;[and] 
preparing a visual image . . . representing the building re-
modeled with the design idea selected by the client.151 
Wholly divorced from particular artifacts, this claim broadly 
appropriates an architectural services technique.  Recently issued 
Patent Office Guidelines further suggest that other business, artifi-
cial intelligence and mathematical processing applications are 
firmly within the grasp of the patent system.152 
Of course, it is the fate of the Patent Office to lead the courts 
on patentability standards.153  In some sense State Street merely 
presents the latest in a series of cases confirming Patent Office 
practice as to the subject matter appropriate for patenting.  But in 
many ways State Street presents the most disturbing episode yet.  It 
seems one thing for courts to place biotechnologies and computer-
related inventions within the patent system, but quite another to 
hold that business methods may be patented.  One need only recall 
the techniques of the Hanseatic League154 or the theory of mercan-
 
151. United States Patent No. 5,668,736 (Sept. 16, 1997). 
152. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF  
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ch. 2100 (7th ed. 1998) (available at 
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html>). 
153. As Judge Mayer noted in Morton Int’l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 
1464, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Mayer, J., concurring): 
Every year about 100,000 new patents are issued, resulting in well over 
1,000,000 patents in force in this country at any time.  These patents are issued 
by the Patent and Trademark Office clothed in a presumption of validity as a 
matter of law and of practicality.  The Patent and Trademark Office, after all, 
consumes a tremendous annual budget, nearly a half billion dollars, and em-
ploys thousands of highly trained individuals working to insure that only de-
serving patents are issued.  This court, on the other hand, might see only one 
hundred and fifty or so contested patents a year, including repeaters.  We there-
fore see at most no more than 0.015% of the patents in force. 
(citations omitted). 
Id. 
154. See T.H. LLOYD, ENGLAND AND THE GERMAN HANSE, 1157-1611: A STUDY OF 
THEIR TRADE AND COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY (Cambridge University Press, 1991); 
JOHANNES SCHILDHAUER, THE HANSA: THEIR HISTORY AND CULTURE (Katherine Vano-
vitch trans. 1985). 
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tilism155 to realize that such methods are far older than the patent 
system itself.  Yet only recently have we been made to understand 
that this sort of practical knowledge may be appropriated via the 
regime of patents.156  The remainder of this Article discusses the 
appropriate range of patentable subject matter, next exploring the 
expansive patenting opportunities suggested by State Street and 
Excel. 
II.  THE EXTENT OF THE TECHNOLOGICAL ARTS 
That the dialogue of the patent law itself scarcely limits the 
possibilities of patenting presents a source of concern.  If the only 
remaining restraints upon patentable subject matter are the lenient 
strictures of novelty or utility, then the pretensions of the patent 
system have expanded vastly beyond its traditional province of in-
dustrial technologies.157  For although the patent system is caught 
up with technology, it has done little to refine its sense of its own 
subject matter other than to say that patents properly canvas the en-
tire waterfront of technique.  In the regime of patents technology 
has become not merely artificial object or industrial activity, but 
the entire body of human knowledge unencumbered by further 
 
155. See LARS MAGNUSSON, MERCANTILISM: THE SHAPING OF AN ECONOMIC 
LANGUAGE (1994); LEONARD GOMES, FOREIGN TRADE AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY: 
MERCANTILIST AND CLASSICAL PERSPECTIVES (1987). 
156. In this regard, State Street holds particularly unsettling possibilities for inven-
tors that maintained their business methods as trade secrets.  Under the rule articulated by 
Judge Learned Hand in Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts, 153 F.2d 
516 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946), a firm that put a business method 
into commercial practice for more than one year, but maintained the method as a trade 
secret, is barred from obtaining a patent on the invention.  Moreover, third parties are free 
to patent the method.  See D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983).  Because business method innovators may have opted for trade secret protec-
tion based upon the traditional rule that such methods were unpatentable, a practical ef-
fect of State Street may be to convert the first inventors of business methods into infring-
ers. 
 Congress attempted to respond to this concern by enacting the First Inventor Defense 
Act of 1999, which was signed into law on November 19, 1999.  Pub. L. No. 106-113 
(1999).  This statute creates a defense available to those charged with infringing “a 
method of doing or conducting business” who reduced the invention to practice one year 
before the effective filing date of the patent, and who “commercially used” that subject 
matter in the United States before the effective filing date.  See Signing of IP Reforms 
Amends Work-for-Hire, Leaves ‘First Inventor Defense’ Unclear, 59 PAT., TRADEMARK 
& COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 330, 331-332 (Dec. 2, 1999). 
157. See supra Part IA. 
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qualification. 
Among the more reviled Patent Office grants has been its 1968 
patent on a method of swallowing a pill.158  Now we need scant 
imagination to envision patents on corporate ingestion of poison 
pills as well.  With business and medical techniques159 firmly un-
der wing, and patents on sports methods160 and procedures of psy-
chological analysis161 trickling out of the Patent Office, patents ap-
propriating almost any sort of communicable practice seem easily 
attainable.  Claims to methods within the disciplines of sociology, 
political science, economics and the law appear to present only the 
nearest frontier for the regime of patents.  Under increasingly per-
missive Federal Circuit case law, techniques within such far-flung 
disciplines as language,162 the fine arts,163 and theology164 appear 
as well to be within the realm of patentability. 
We have good reason to doubt whether such innovations lie 
within the “useful arts,” the constitutional stricture concerning pat-
entable subject matter.165  The sparse materials we possess regard-
ing this term suggests that the Framers were unlikely to see every 
 
158. United States Patent No. 3,418,999 (Dec. 31, 1968).  
159. See infra notes 232-244 and accompanying text. 
160. See generally Carl A. Kukkonen, III, Be a Good Sport and Refrain from Using 
My Patented Putt: Intellectual Property Protection For Sports Related Movements, 80 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 808 (1998). 
161. United States Patent No. 5,190,458 (Mar. 2, 1993) (“Character assessment 
method”). 
162. See United States Patent No. 4,864,503 (Sep. 5, 1989) (“Method of using a 
created international language as an intermediate pathway in translation between two na-
tional languages”); See also The Wired Diaries, 7.01 WIRED 97, 135 (Jan. 1999) (Attrib-
uting to Norman Fischer, abbot, Green Gulch Farm Zen Center the observation that “[t]he 
real technology—behind all of our other technologies—is language.  It actually creates 
the world our consciousness lives in.”). 
163. See United States Patent No. 5,730,052 (Mar. 24, 1998) (“Method of high reso-
lution silk screen printing”).  But see Greenewalt v. Stanley Co. of Am., 54 F.2d 195, 196 
(3d Cir. 1931) (“We do not find authority in the law for the issuance of a patent for re-
sults dependent upon such intangible, illusory, and nonmaterial things as emotional or 
aesthetic reactions.”). 
164. See United States Patent No. 5,734,795 (Mar. 31, 1998) (“System for allowing 
a person to experience systems of mythology”). 
165. See Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an 
“Article of Manufacture:” Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. COMPUTER & INFO. 
L. 89, 129-34 (1998). 
THOMASFMT.DOC 9/29/2006  3:28 PM 
34 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.10:3 
created thing as encompassed within it.166  They undoubtedly con-
templated the industrial, mechanical and manual arts of the late 
Eighteenth Century, in contrast to the seven “liberal arts” and the 
four “fine arts” of classical learning.167  The Framers were also 
likely aware of the English experience leading to the Statute of 
Monopolies.168  The principal aim of that legislation was to pro-
scribe grants of monopolies except for any letters patent providing 
the exclusive right “of the sole working or making of any manner 
of new manufactures within this realme, to the true and first inven-
tor . . . .”169  In a passage especially worthy of consideration fol-
lowing State Street, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ex-
plained that the inclusion of the patent and copyright clause in the 
Constitution “doubtlessly was due to the fact that those who for-
mulated the Constitution were familiar with the long struggle over 
monopolies so prominent in English history, where exclusive 
rights to engage even in ordinary business activities were granted 
so frequently by the Crown . . . .”170 
Whether the State Street panel has respected the policy con-
cerns that animated the Statute of Monopolies remains question-
able.  Yet, in fairness to the Federal Circuit, articulation of a useful 
typology between technology and other aspects of human culture 
has proven exceptionally difficult.  Human engagement with the 
artificial has become so complete that distinguishing technological 
things from those that are not has perplexed not only the courts, 
but even epistemologists and the most accomplished of technologi-
 
166. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher-
Wright, ed. 1961) (“The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Brit-
ain to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason 
to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims 
of individuals.”).  Madison’s reference to contemporary British law hardly suggests a 
radical view of patentable subject matter. 
167. See Robert I. Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 487, 494-96 (1952).  “The seven historic ‘liberal arts’ were: grammar, logic (dia-
lectics), rhetoric, arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy.  The four ‘fine arts’ were: 
painting, drawing, architecture and sculpture; to which were often added: poetry, music, 
dancing and drama.”  Id. at 494. 
168. See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: Ameri-
can Patent Law and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part 2), 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 11, 26-27 (1998). 
169.  Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam. 1, ch. 3 §6 (1623).  
170. In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (CCPA 1951) (emphasis added). 
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cal observers.171 
Economic analysis may offer some suggestions about the pro-
priety of patents within particular areas of endeavor.  Following 
State Street, economists may be able to tell us whether the patent 
system would benefit or harm particular industrial sectors by influ-
encing such factors as the engagement in unproductive activity, 
rate of innovation or market concentration.  An initial sense of the 
financial services industry would not appear optimistic.  In-house 
use of financial products appears extremely difficult to track, for 
the only observable throughput consists of profits and losses on in-
vestor balance sheets.172  The policing of financial services patents 
would seemingly require costly infringement searches, just the sort 
of activity a sound patent system should discourage. 
Economic analysis might also suggest the impact of the sur-
prisingly strong correlation between the claims of Signature’s pat-
ent and portions of the Internal Revenue Code.173  Commentators 
have expressed concerns over the attempted privatization of the 
law by such efforts as claiming copyright in jump citations.174  But 
such an effort appears enfeebled when compared with the more ro-
bust property right afforded by the patent grant.  If, as the Federal 
Circuit noted in State Street, the only practical tax code compli-
ance mechanism for sophisticated financial products consists of 
computerized accounting,175 then economists may well possess the 
best set of tools for predicting the impact of patents resembling 
that of Signature. 
The difficulties with such attempted analyses should be appar-
ent, however.  Legal economists simply possess no experience 
 
171. CARL MITCHAM, THINKING THROUGH TECHNOLOGY: THE PATH BETWEEN 
ENGINEERING AND PHILOSOPHY 154-60 (1994). 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 101-105. 
173. See  I.R.C. § 706(d) (1994); IRS Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b), 1.704-1(f).  See Richard 
Stern, Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing 
Business 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 132 (1999). 
174. See Alfred C. Yen, The Danger of Bootstrap Formalism in Copyright, 5 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 453 (1998); James H. Wyman, Comment, Freeing The Law: Case Re-
porter Copyright And The Universal Citation System, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 217 (1996); 
Robin Lee Pedersen, Comment, West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Ins. (Lexis), 
14 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 359 (1988). 
175. 149 F.3d at 1371. 
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whatsoever with patents of this sort and appear disinclined to seek 
out empirical evidence that might sustain their analysis.  Lacking 
any data whatsoever as to the potential effect of the patent system 
in the financial service and other professional communities, much 
economic evaluation of this issue would seem reducible to thought 
experiments offered in the same vein as traditional legal analyses.  
While we should be grateful for whatever insights logical reason-
ing from such fundamental propositions as the downward-sloping 
demand curve can give us, so too should we call for data-gathering 
and refinement when economic analysis is applied to the discipline 
of intellectual property.176 
This Article instead draws support from comparative legal 
studies and that body of thinking fashioned as the philosophy of 
technology.  It takes a sympathetic reading of previous attempts to 
explain the place of technological activities within the whole of 
human endeavor.  While not the place to develop a comprehensive 
metaphysics of human undertakings, this Article does attempt to 
apply this learning to consider the legitimacy of the view of the 
State Street court that any technique that achieves pragmatic re-
sults is patentable. 
In doing so this Article follows the tack of many courts by em-
ploying the word “technology” synonymously with the constitu-
tional term “useful art.”177  For although “technology” is not a term 
the Framers would likely have commonly employed, it has come to 
dominate its historical predecessor.  Derived from the Greek word 
“techne,”178 the first appearances of the term “technology” in Eng-
lish documents occurred only at the start of the seventeenth cen-
 
176. See George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual 
Property, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND 
COPYRIGHTS 19, 19-20 (John Palmer & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986) (“The ratio of 
empirical demonstration to assumption in the literature [applying economic analysis to 
the field of intellectual property] must be very close to zero . . . .  I do not believe it is 
unfair to say that the . . . literature of which I am aware [has] consisted of little more than 
assumptions.  As a consequence, this literature has taught us almost nothing, not has it 
guided research or thinking so that an approach with a firmer empirical base could be de-
veloped.”). 
177. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
178. See DON IHDE, Philosophy of Technology: An Introduction, in PARAGON ISSUES 
IN PHILOSOPHY 26 (1993). 
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tury.  A 1706 dictionary defining technology as “a Description of 
the Arts, especially in the Mechanical,” suggests the identity of 
these terms.179  Use of the term “technology” not only offers a less 
cumbersome terminology, it promotes the application of a diversity 
of thought about this most dominant aspect of contemporary soci-
ety. 
A.  From Applied Science to Rational Action 
The first English work to employ the term “technology” in its 
title, Jacob Bigelow’s 1831 ELEMENTS OF TECHNOLOGY, serves as 
a good starting point for exploring the meaning of that term.  Bige-
low explained that technology involved “the principles, processes, 
and nomenclatures of the more conspicuous arts, particularly those 
which involve applications of science.”180  Bigelow’s view of 
technology as applied science remains popular today, enlisting 
such supporters as Joseph Henry,181 Vannevar Bush,182 and John 
Kenneth Galbraith.183  Even the Patent Office has adopted this po-
sition, defining technology as “the application of science and engi-
neering to the development of machines and procedures in order to 
enhance or improve human conditions, or at least to improve hu-
man efficiency in some respect.”184 
But the simple view of technology as applied science cannot 
withstand a sustained analysis.  Historical technologists con-
structed artifacts ranging from arches to airplanes without any sys-
tematic knowledge of statics or aerodynamics.185  Contemporary 
scientific disciplines from astronomy to particle physics further 
suggest that this definition is skewed, for they rely so heavily upon 
instrumental technologies that they could fairly be described as ap-
 
179. See MITCHAM, supra note 171, at 114, 130. 
 180.   Jacob Bigelow, Elemenrs of Technology (1831). 
181. See E.T. Layton, Jr., American Ideologies of Science and Engineering, 17 
TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 688, 69 ( 1976). 
182. See SUBRATA DASGUPTA, TECHNOLOGY AND CREATIVITY 151 (1996). 
183. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 12 (2d rev. ed. 
1971). 
184. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, EXAMINATION GUIDELINES 
FOR COMPUTER-RELATED INVENTIONS, 61 FED. REG. 7478, 7488 (Feb. 28, 1996) [herein-
after SOFTWARE GUIDELINES]. 
185. See GEORGE BASALLA, THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY 27-28 (1988). 
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plied technologies.186  And historians have demonstrated that over-
reliance upon scientific knowledge has sometimes hindered tech-
nological development, as successful product design proceeds 
more often from “bottom-up” development than “top-down” ex-
tension of scientific theories.187 
Last, this position also fails to appreciate the extraordinary dif-
ferences between the tools, attitudes and experimental methods of 
scientific and engineering practice.188  Although some of the theo-
retical tools for engineering design derive from science, many do 
not and some are even problematic to the scientific community.  In 
particular, the set of idealized artifacts, technical skills and prag-
matic considerations indigenous to engineering practice have little 
place in scientific endeavors.  Technology is much more than ap-
plied scientific knowledge, but is itself a distinct form of knowl-
edge.189 
Dissatisfied with a science-based definition, individuals have 
sought other bases for reasoning about technology.  In an era of in-
tensive individual interaction with the artificial, we should not be 
surprised to find exceptionally broad definitions of what comprises 
the technological.  Standard dictionaries explain that technology 
concerns “bodies of skills, knowledge, and procedures for making, 
using and doing useful things”190 or “systematic knowledge and 
action, usually of industrial processes but applicable to any recur-
rent activity.”191  Essayist Daniel Bell tells us that “[t]echnology is 
the instrumental ordering of human experience within a logic of ef-
 
186. See Don Ihde, Technics and Praxis in (1979) Boston Studies in The Philosophy 
of Science (Robert S. Cohen and Mark W. Wartofsky, eds., 1979). 
187. See Ronald Kline, Science and Engineering Theory in the Invention and De-
velopment of the Induction Motor, 1880-1900, 28 TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE 283 
(1987). 
188. See DASGUPTA, supra note 182, at 152-56; MITCHAM, supra note 171, at 199-
204. 
189. See, e.g. I.C. Jarvie, Technology and the Structure of Knowledge, 
in PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY: READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF 
TECHNOLOGY 54, 55 (Carl Mitcham & Robert Mackey eds., 1972); MITCHAM, supra note 
171, at 203. 
190. 15 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 576 (1968). 
191. MCGRAW-HILL CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1876 
(3d ed. 1994). 
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ficient means”;192 commentator Frederick Ferré would go further 
to define technology merely as the “practical implementations of 
intelligence.”193  And as Marshall McLuhan mused, on his way to 
concluding that individual communications media present their 
own message: 
It makes no difference whether one considers as arti-
facts . . . things of a tangible “hardware” nature such as 
bowls and clubs or forks and spoons, or tools and devices 
and engines, railways, spacecraft, radios, computers and so 
on; or things of a “software” nature such as theories or laws 
of science, philosophical systems, . . . forms or styles in 
painting or poetry or drama or music, and so.  All are 
equally artifacts, all equally human.194 
Paradigmatic of this embracing vision of technology is the dis-
cipline of cybernetics.195  Since its emergence from early research 
in neurophysiology and gradual expansion into information theory 
and artificial intelligence, cybernetics has considered its subject 
matter “the domain of all possible machines.”196  Disinterested in 
whether that machine is “electronic, mechanical, neural, or eco-
nomic,” cybernetics pursues the goal of communication and con-
trol of any regular, determinate or reproducible behavior.197  The 
cybernetic vision of a device as a series of linked information 
stages expands the possibilities of technological knowledge to diz-
zying heights.  For cybernetics offers nothing less than “the 
framework on which all individual machines may be ordered, re-
lated, and understood”198— a unified theory of material, social and 
mental phenomenon.199 
 
192. DANIEL BELL, THE WINDING PASSAGE: ESSAYS AND SOCIOLOGICAL JOURNEYS 
1960-1980,  20 (1980). 
193. FREDERICK FERRÉ, PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 26 (1988). 
194. MARSHALL MCLUHAN & ERIC MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE 
EXTENSIONS OF MAN 3 (2d ed. 1965). 
195. See NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS, OR CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION IN 
THE ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE (2d ed. 1961). 
196. See W. ROSS ASHBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERNETICS 2 (1956). 
197. Id.  
198. Id. 
199. See MITCHAM, supra note 171, at 205.  See also Allan Newell, Response: The 
Models Are Broken, The Models Are Broken!, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023 (1985) (collaps-
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The view of patentable subject matter expressed in State Street 
fairly reflects these developments in our philosophy of technol-
ogy.200  Judging methods of doing business as within the ambit of 
the patent system too presents a pretentious view of technological 
activity, one that has come to reject a scientific backdrop and in-
stead concluded that the term “technology” connotes any form of 
rational human action.  Any technique for achieving efficiency in 
any sphere of human endeavor appears amenable to patenting, so 
long as that method is communicable and capable of achieving a 
useful result. 
Yet few of us would suppose that inventions within the domain 
of business, the law or fine arts constitute technology, and in par-
ticular patentable technology.  The standpoint of cybernetics is 
hardly in the mainstream.  Its constructions of technology often 
amount to little more than provocative slogans that naively equate 
all forms of knowledge and assume that all human endeavor is sus-
ceptible to rational manipulation.  Other definitions appear to suf-
fer from their conciseness, presenting as well an extreme view of 
technological phenomenon.201  Still others are purposive, forming 
part of the effort to subject technological issues to philosophical 
inquiry, or, even worse, contemporary society to withering com-
mentary.202 
Surely we can articulate a more refined sense of that set of ac-
tions and objects that we might judge as technological in charac-
ter.203  A reasoned epistemology of human activity, reflective both 
of our sense of the technological order and the traditions of the 
 
ing distinctions between the study of human behavior and computer science). 
200. See supra  text accompanying notes 111-116. 
201. See N. Bruce Hannay & Robert E. McGinn, The Anatomy of Modern Technol-
ogy: Prolegomenon to an Improved Public Policy for the Social Management of Tech-
nology, 109 DAEDALUS 25, 26 (Winter 1980) (“The nascent field of technology studies is 
littered with unsuccessful attempts to capture and display the supposed Platonic essence 
of technology in a succinct phrase or two.”). 
202. See LEWIS MUMFORD, THE MYTH OF THE MACHINE: THE PENTAGON OF POWER 
(1970); JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson trans., 1964); 
HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED 
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964).  
203. But see Rachel Laudan, Introduction, in THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
KNOWLEDGE: ARE MODELS OF SCIENTIFIC CHANGE RELEVANT? 1, 5 (1984) (noting that 
attempts to demarcate technology from other activities are “probably fruitless”). 
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patent system, would allow us to better define that subject matter 
which could be patented and that which could not.  This Article 
next takes up this effort, turning to several discussions of the ontic 
dimension of technology. 
B.  Towards a Refined View of Technology 
As a central aspect of modern life, technology has attracted a 
justifiable amount of concern and commentary.  Yet divergence 
concerning the scope of this phenomenon has often hindered dis-
course.  Engineering, epistemological, sociological, anthropologi-
cal and phenomenological perspectives have lent the term “tech-
nology” connotations varying from artifacts, to knowledge, to 
sociotechnical systems of manufacture and use.204  Despite the 
ubiquity of the technological encounter, no recognized taxonomy 
of technological characteristics exists. 
Perceptive commentators have attempted to lend congruency 
and structure to this dialogue by unpacking the term “technol-
ogy.”205  A review of this literature holds promise for the patent 
system as well.  As the principal legal response to technological 
change, the regime of patents too has suffered from its inability to 
develop a coherent sense of its own subject matter.  This Article 
turns first to the sustained effort by Robert McGinn to define the 
technological. 
In several publications addressing technology policy, McGinn 
has consistently identified technology as a manifestation of human 
culture that takes its place alongside art, sport, philosophy and 
other endeavors.206  Technology is not the same as these activities, 
however, and may be distinguished by several traits.  In an early 
article, What is Technology?, McGinn observed that technological 
 
204. See PAUL W. DEVORE, TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 220-22 (1980); Mi-
chael Fores, Some terms in the discussion of technology and innovation, 6 TECHNOLOGY 
AND SOC’Y no.2, 56 (Oct. 1970). 
205. See Stephen J. Kline, What is Technology?, 1 BULL. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & 
SOCIETY 215 (1988). 
206. See ROBERT E. MCGINN, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 16 (1991); Han-
nay & McGinn, supra note 201, at 26; Robert E. McGinn, What is Technology?, in 1 
RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY: AN ANNUAL COMPILATION OF RESEARCH 
179, 180 (Paul T. Durbin, Ed.,1978) [hereinafter McGinn, What is Technology?]. 
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activity is a purposive, methodological enterprise that fabricates or 
is constitutive of material outcomes.207  According to McGinn, 
technology should also be seen as a resource-based and resource-
expending endeavor that necessarily utilizes or generates knowl-
edge.  He further suggests a rubric of “material product-making or 
object-transforming activity” to distinguish that which is techno-
logical.208 
McGinn and his colleague, N. Bruce Hannay, further devel-
oped this analysis by assessing technology in terms of its content 
and form.  Hannay and McGinn judged the content of technology 
to be “the complex of knowledge, methods, and other resources 
used in making a particular kind of product or in creating a particu-
lar procedural system.”209  That technologies could be used to 
manufacture products seems straightforward enough, but some 
ambiguity surrounds their sense of a “procedural system.”  Do they 
wish to connote discrete production techniques, or do they mean to 
invoke the entire social and physical environment that surrounds 
that making? While proceeding to describe the systems context of 
modern technologies, Hannay and McGinn suggest the former: 
Many products of modern technology, whether exhibiting 
interior systematic complexity or not, are intimately inter-
twined with, if not embedded in, complex sociotechical 
support systems on which their manufacture, use, and 
maintenance depend, for example, telephones and cars.  To 
purchase such items is to gain admission into a web of 
complex sociotechnical systems.  To buy a car is, in a real 
sense, to buy into a complex road, energy supply, parts dis-
tribution, maintenance, registration, insurance, police, and 
legal systems.210 
To Hannay and McGinn, then, the fact that technologies are inevi-
tably embedded in cultural contexts does not render all human en-
deavors into technologies themselves. 
Hannay and McGinn also identified several aspects of the form 
 
207. McGinn, What is Technology?, supra note 206, at 180. 
208. Id. at 181. 
209. See Hannay & McGinn, supra note 201, at 27. 
210. Id. at 28. 
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of technology that contrast it with other human activities.  The in-
puts to technological processes consist of raw or already processed 
material along with bodies of information.  Technology involves 
the use of knowledge of the properties of its input resources, along 
with energy, information, tools, and perceptual and neuromuscular 
skills, to generate material products and procedural systems.  The 
function of technology is the production, management and use of 
material objects, and for the control and enhancement of other 
forms of human activity.  Technology is thus concerned with de-
sign, fabrication and transformation.211 
Technology may also be distinguished by its environmental 
context.  As described by Hannay and McGinn:  
[T]echnology differs from other activity-forms in that the 
natural environment –- both in respect to the meteorologi-
cal and creature-related threats it poses to human survival, 
and the spatiotemporal obstacles it presents to human de-
sires for communication and transport –- is a factor that 
more powerfully and more directly conditions technology 
than is the case with other cultural forms, for example, re-
ligion and art.212 
Hannay and McGinn summarized their reasoning by characterizing 
technology “as that form of cultural activity devoted to the produc-
tion or transformation of material objects, or the creation of proce-
dural systems, in order to expand the realm of practical human 
possibility.”213 
The views of Paul W. DeVore about the nature of technology, 
developed in his eponymous textbook, complement those of 
McGinn.214  DeVore also differentiates technological pursuits from 
other spheres of human activity, noting that: 
The character of thinking involved in creating a philosophi-
cal position, a new religion, or an alternate form of gov-
ernment is different from the character of thinking involved 
in technological activities.  Thinking in technology is prob-
 
211. Id. at 27. 
 212.   Id. 
213. Id. 
214. See PAUL W. DEVORE, TECHNOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION (1980). 
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lem specific and environmentally specific, concerned with 
efficiency and the relationship of elements in the behavior 
of a total system.215 
To DeVore, the goal of acclimation to the physical environ-
ment is a paramount distinguishing trait of technology.216  
“[T]echnological knowledge is knowledge generated through ac-
tivities involved in creating adaptive systems as opposed to knowl-
edge used to create ideological and/or social systems.”217  DeVore 
also stresses that technology can only be understood within the so-
cial milieu in which it is situated.  Yet he distinguishes technology 
from “the associative, ideological and environmental systems of 
society” and studies the relationship between technology and other 
disciplines.218 
While contrasting technology and science, DeVore notes that 
the goal of technology is “to create new and useful products, de-
vices, machines or systems.”219  In technological pursuits, design is 
the key component for resolving problems of materials, energy, in-
formation and control.  DeVore identifies as technological tools, 
machines, techniques and technical systems of production, trans-
portation and communication.220 
Carl Mitcham has also recently engaged in a comprehensive 
discussion of the nature of technology.221  Building upon the analy-
sis of McGinn and his predecessors, Mitcham develops a frame-
work for philosophical analysis that explores technology as mani-
fested in objects, knowledge, activity and volition.222  Most useful 
here is his development of a philosophy of action that embraces 
technology.  In a discussion oriented towards patentable processes, 
development of the sense of technology as a behavioral 
engagement holds great potential for refining an ontology of tech-
nology.  And while the term “technology” etymologically implies 
 
215. Id. at 226. 
216. Id. at 225. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 253. 
219. Id. at 241. 
220. Id. at 182-212. 
221. MITCHAM, supra, note 171. 
222. Id. at 157-60. 
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knowledge, and is perhaps most routinely conceptualized in terms 
of physical embodiments, the event of technology may be its most 
significant realization.  For only technology as activity brings 
about the application of knowledge towards the fabrication or use 
of artifacts.223 
Mitcham identifies paradigmatic technological activities as 
crafting, inventing, designing, manufacturing, working, operating 
and maintaining.224  To Mitcham, the essence of invention—that 
all-important term in the patent law—is “the concrete transforma-
tion of materials—making an imagined transformation physically 
real.”225  He contrasts engineering design with artistic creation: 
Art also is concerned with imagining, but its images cannot 
be quantitatively analyzed—they are not subject to any 
well-developed calculus.  Thus art, in contrast to engineer-
ing, appears as both more intuitive and more dependent on 
the senses.  Although artists too are concerned to design ar-
tifacts, they necessarily do so in drawings and models that 
remain much closer in their reality to the final product.  
Compare, for instance, a Rembrandt sketch for a painting 
with an engineering drawing of a building.  Even the Rem-
brandt sketch is art; the engineering drawing is simply 
thrown away.226 
Mitcham would also distinguish between technology and tech-
nique.  He suggests that the technological stresses the rational ma-
nipulation of external artifacts, while technique concerns the train-
ing of the human body and mind.227  Thus we can speak of the 
techniques, but not the technologies, of hitting a baseball or orga-
nizing a political party.  While technique contains unrationalized 
components, technology is concerned with the conscious articula-
tion of rules and principles.  To Mitcham, the core of the techno-
logical project concerns the desire to transform the heuristics of 
technique into the algorithms of practice.228 
 
223. Id. at 209. 
224. Id. at 210. 
225. Id. at 216. 
226. Id. at 230. 
227. Id. at 236. 
228. Id. at 236. 
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Mitcham also cautions against viewing all human behavior as 
technology.  While exploring the possibilities of technological us-
ings, he notes that: 
Although one can speak of walking on a sidewalk as using 
the sidewalk, of living in a house as using the house, of 
looking at a painting as using the painting, of reading a 
book of poetry as using the book, of playing the violin as 
using the violin, and of driving a car as using the car, in 
each case the connotations are quite different.  Those hu-
man activities that have a self-contained quality about 
them, such as looking at a painting, reading a book, or play-
ing the violin, seem most incorrectly described simply as 
use; indeed, to do so is common only when the user has 
missed the point of the objects concerned, that is, has failed 
to engage them in the proper manner.  If a person is de-
scribed as “using a book” one would be likely to think that 
he was doing something other than reading it—sitting on it, 
maybe.  It is noteworthy that many usings, perhaps the less 
technological ones, have their own proper names, as with 
looking at works of art, reading books, or playing musical 
instruments.229 
A review of commentators such as McGinn, DeVore and Mit-
cham illustrates that we can achieve a structured definition of tech-
nology.  Although embedded in social systems, technology is an 
endeavor that both intuition and sustained analysis would distin-
guish from other aspects of human society.  In brief, technology 
may be characterized as knowledge that is applied towards mate-
rial enterprise, guided by an orientation to the external environ-
ment and the necessity of design.  In its next Part, this Article at-
tempts to apply these studies to the patent project, moving from a 
characterological to a definitional strategy. 
III.  STATUTORY SOLUTIONS TO PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
Contemporary thought demonstrates that we can achieve a re-
fined sense of that set of activities that are properly conceived as 
 
229. Id. at 232. 
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technological.  Yet applying this learning to the patent project is by 
no means straightforward.  This Article reviews two possible 
mechanisms for affirming our sense of the technological in the pat-
ent law.  The first is piecemeal in character.  As exemplified by the 
recent United States experience regarding patents on methods of 
medical treatment,230 we might selectively prohibit patenting or 
constrain the remedies available to patentees in certain areas of en-
deavor.  Another possibility is the adoption of an essentialist defi-
nition that more completely captures our sense of the technologi-
cal.  Taking as its touchstone the so-called “industrial application” 
standard prevalent in the world’s patent statutes,231 this Article also 
explores the possibility of incorporating this standard into United 
States patent law. 
A.  Patents and the Professions: The Medical Experience 
A broad sense of patentable subject matter brings forward a set 
of concerns not just of the technological sense, but also of the pur-
suit of the professions.  Few doubts should surround the sorts of 
persons who should be newly attracted to the patent system.  
Bounded by the requirement of nonobviousness, the patent law 
concerns disciplinary understandings that exceed the state of the 
art.232  In contemporary society this sort of knowledge is often held 
not just by any follower of a particular occupation, but by a mem-
ber of a profession.  Such occupations as medicine, law, teaching 
and the ministry, the so-called “liberal professions,” are marked by 
some criteria that suggest an enthusiasm for patenting: raw materi-
als drawn from systematic learning; their practical application; and 
a communicable technique.233 
Yet other professional norms suggest that traditionally patent-
free professions may resist the prospect of extensive appropriation 
of their techniques.  Patents have the potential to constrain profes-
 
 230.  See American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 
Ethical Issues in the Patenting of Medical Procedures, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341 (1998). 
 231.  See Todd F. Volyn, Agreement Consummation in International Technology 
Transfers, 33 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 241 (1993). 
232. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994). 
233. See MIKE W. MARTIN & ROLAND SCHINZINGER, ETHICS IN ENGINEERING 155-56 
(1983). 
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sionals in the exercise of autonomous responsibility in their prac-
tices.  Further, the ability of the profession to serve the public good 
may also be affected by patenting, which could alter the willing-
ness of professionals to disseminate and put into practice new 
learning.  Most significantly, the tendency of professions to organ-
ize suggests that a vocal and established lobby will be on hand to 
debate the place of patenting within their community.234 
The patent system has experienced this phenomenon before.  
Medical practitioners have for decades obtained patents on meth-
ods of medical treatment ranging from administering insulin to 
treating cancer.235  Although traditionally few patentees had at-
tempted to enforce such patents,236 in the early 1990’s  Dr. Samuel 
Pallin alleged that another physician infringed his patented cataract 
surgery procedure.237  The lawsuit led to a raging debate that ques-
tioned the impact of patents upon medical ethics, patient care and 
professional autonomy.  Although some urged that such patents of-
fered individuals incentives to invent and disclose new medical 
methods, others pointed to the possibility that patents might restrict 
access to life-saving techniques, lead to invasions of patient pri-
vacy, and override the culture of disclosure and peer review that 
pervades the medical community.238 
Following the condemnation of patents on methods of medical 
treatment by the American Medical Association House of Dele-
gates, Congress reacted by amending the Patent Act.  As codified 
in § 287(c), the new statute deprives patentees of remedies against 
medical practitioners engaged in infringing “medical activity.”239  
 
234. See id. 
235. See William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical and Surgical Procedures, 77 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 651 (1995); United States Patent No. 5,364,838 (Nov. 15, 
1994) (method of intrapulmonary administration of insulin); United States Patent No. 
5,456,663 (Oct. 10, 1995) (method of treating cancer). 
236. Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent 
Legislation, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329, 354-55 (1997). 
237. See Pallin v. Singer, Civ. No. 5:93-202, 1995 WL 608365 (D. Vt. May 1, 
1995). 
238. See Beata Gocyk-Farber, Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search for a Com-
promise Between Ethics and Economics, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1527 (1997). 
239. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1994).  See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Remedies Under Pat-
ents on Medical and Surgical Procedures, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 789 
(1996). 
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Although the Patent Office may still issue patents on medical 
methods, the inability of such instruments to provide their owner 
with any relief essentially renders them a legal nullity.240 
The response of the medical establishment may serve as a good 
predictor of the reaction of other professions that are newcomers to 
the patent system.  Already members of the business community 
have expressed disbelief at the large number of patented business 
methods issuing from the Patent Office, particularly those concern-
ing Internet business models.241  Whether business and other pro-
fessionals will also possess the wherewithal to persuade Congress 
to create particularized patent-free spheres of activity remains to be 
seen, however.  Few occupations are as well-organized, imbued 
with a sense of profession and capable of employing the rhetoric of 
public service as the practice of medicine. 
But a more forceful impediment to further amendments of the 
patent statute is not practical, but legal in character.  Among the 
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement, a component of the re-
cently executed World Trade Organization treaty, is that “patents 
shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimina-
tion as to . . . the field of technology.”242  That agreement goes on 
to provide that signatories may exclude from patentability “diag-
nostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of hu-
mans or animals.”243  Under a strict reading of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, § 287(c) presents a violation: signatories may deny such 
patents altogether but not discriminate against any issued patents. 
Of course, this argument is rather technical.  Recalling the 
maxim non debet cui plus licet, quod minus est non licere–a form 
of the maxim “the greater includes the lesser”—the holders of 
 
240. Gocyk-Farber, supra note 238, at 1528. 
241. See, e.g., Teresa Riordan, E-commerce Patents Reopen Legal Questions from 
the Past Debate: Should a Business Method Be Made Property?, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 11, 
1999) at 2; Richard A. Kaplan, Intellectual Property: Patenting Business Methods a 
More Viable Option, 22 CHI. LAW. 7 (Jan. 1999); Bruce W. Foudree & Peter K. Trzyna, 
Patenting In Insurance Starts Shaping Up As Robust Discipline, NATIONAL 
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH-FINANCIAL SERVICES EDITION (Dec. 14, 1998); Robert M. 
Kunstadt, Sneak Attack on U.S. Inventiveness,  NAT’L L.J., NOV. 9, 1998, at A21. 
242. TRIPS Agreement art. 27. 
243. Id. 
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medical method patents may not feel particularly aggrieved.244  
Not so for inventors within other disciplines.  It appears that the 
solution reached in § 287(c) will remain unique to the medical 
community.  With piecemeal legislative reactions to an increas-
ingly receptive patent system out of the question, we must seek 
other mechanisms for obtaining sound parameters of patentable 
subject matter.  This Article turns to this task next, seeking a more 
refined view of technological activity from comparative legal 
analysis. 
B.  Industrial Application 
A second method of limiting the scope of patent eligibility to 
the technological would be to legislate an essentialist definition 
into our patent statute.  In this regard we can receive guidance 
from two of the world’s great patent statutes, the European Patent 
Convention245 and the Japanese Patent Act.246  Each of these laws 
require that inventions be susceptible of so-called “industrial appli-
cation” in order for patent protection to be forthcoming.247  Con-
cise, proven and compatible with the TRIPS Agreement, the requi-
site of industrial applicability provides an apt way to limit the 
patent system to what we understand to be technological. 
The requirement of industrial application has long been part of 
the German patent law.248  As originally conceived, industrial ap-
plication required that patented technologies involve the treatment 
 
244. A more accurate translation of this phrase, attributed to the Roman jurist 
Ulpian, is: “He to whom the greater is lawful ought not to be debarred from the less as 
unlawful.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1052 (6th ed. 1990).  The most famous use of the 
phrase in the patent law occurred in Justice Holmes’ noteworthy dissent in Motion Pic-
ture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519-20 (1917). 
245. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, as amended by Decision of the 
Administration Council of the European Patent Organization of December 21, 1978, re-
printed in 13 I.L.M. 268 [hereinafter “European Patent Convention”].  The European Pat-
ent Convention creates a centralized mechanism for granting a set of national patents ef-
fective in the contracting states. 
246. Japanese Patent Act, Law No. 121 of 1959, reprinted in 6 EHS Law Bulletin 
Series Japan SA-A1 (1994) [hereinafter Japanese Patent Act]. 
247. See European Patent Convention, supra note 245, at Art. 52; Japanese Patent 
Act, supra note 246, at Art. § 29. 
 248.  David L. Cohen, Article 69 and European Patent Integration, 92 NW.U. L. 
REV. 1082 (1998).  
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or processing of raw materials through mechanical or chemical 
means.249  The requirement has been more recently read to require 
a “technical rule for the control of natural forces,”250 or, stated 
somewhat differently, “a teaching for systematic activity using 
controllable natural forces for the attainment of a causally predict-
able result.”251 
Currently the European Patent Convention presents the most 
fulsome articulation of the industrial applicability standard.  Arti-
cle 52 of the European Patent Convention stipulates that the fol-
lowing shall not be considered patentable inventions: 
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical meth-
ods; 
(b) aesthetic creations; 
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, 
playing games or doing business, and programs for com-
puters; 
(d) presentations of information.252 
Article 57 of the European Patent Convention goes on to pro-
vide that “[a]n invention shall be considered as susceptible of in-
dustrial application if it can be made or used in any kind of indus-
try, including agriculture.”253  In its Examination Guidelines, the 
European Patent Office describes Article 57 as a reinforcing provi-
sion that excludes from patentability few inventions not set forth in 
Article 52.254 
That Article 52 expressly excludes “programs for computers” 
may seem implausible to many, especially those familiar with the 
 
249. Rainer Moufang, Methods of Medical Treatment Under Patent Law, 24 INT’L 
REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 18, 22 (1993). 
250. A.E.K. v. Federal Patent Office, 15 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 
82, 83 (1984) (reporting the September 21, 1982 opinion of the Swiss Supreme Court). 
251. Gert Kolle, The Patentable Invention in the European Patent Convention, 5 
INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 140, 146 (1974). 
252. European Patent Convention, supra note 245, art. 52. 
253. European Patent Convention, supra note 245, art. 57. 
254. See GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, Part C at 
40 (1994). 
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European Patent Office Gazette.  In fact, the European Patent Of-
fice has drawn a distinction between computer software per se and 
its application towards the resolution of technical problems, and 
excluded from patentability only the former class of inventions.255  
Thus such inventions as manufacturing control software, signal 
processing and CAD/CAM systems have been held patentable.256  
The European Patent Office has also granted claims relating to the 
functioning of the computer as such, including programs concern-
ing memory management, data organization and operating sys-
tems.257  However, computer-related inventions relating to such 
matters as processing text258 or learning to play a keyboard instru-
ment259 have been rejected as lacking a technical effect. 
The Japanese Patent Office has also issued extensive guidelines 
on the industrial application requirement.260  That agency views the 
requirement of industrial application to complement the Japanese 
Patent Act’s definition of a statutory invention, the “creation of 
technical ideas utilizing natural laws.”261  Inventions claiming dis-
coveries or natural laws as such, mere discoveries, personal skill, 
the mere presentation of information, aesthetic creations and mat-
ter contrary to natural laws are judged to be nonstatutory.262 
The Japanese Patent Office Guidelines also identify a number 
of inventions that fail to fulfill the standard of industrial applica-
tion.  Methods of medical treatment and inventions utterly incapa-
ble of practical deployment, such as the method of preserving the 
ozone layer by covering the entire surface of the earth with ultra-
violet light-absorbing film, fall within this category.263  In addition, 
the Japanese Patent Office also denies patentability to inventions 
 
255. See Sean J. Hackett, Patent Protection in Europe For Software Inventions, 479 
PLI/Pat 889 (May 5, 1997). 
256. VICOM, Decision T 208/84, [1987] OJ EPO 14 (July 15, 1986). 
257. See Data processor network/IBM, T 6/83, [1990] O.J. EPO 5 (Oct. 6, 1988). 
258. See Document abstracting and retrieving, T 22/85, [1990] O.J. EPO 12 (Oct. 
5, 1988). 
259. See Marker/BEATTIE, T 603/89, 1992 O.J. EPO 230 (July 3, 1990). 
260. See JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION 
OF INDUSTRIALLY APPLICABLE INVENTIONS (April 1, 1997) [hereinafter Japanese Patent 
Office Guidelines].. 
261. Japanese Patent Act, supra note 246, at Art. 2(1). 
262. JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE GUIDELINES, supra note 260, at 1-4. 
263. Id. at 4-7. 
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that lack a commercial character.  Among such inventions are 
those limited to individual use, such as a method of smoking a 
cigarette.264 
Although the European and Japanese patent systems share a 
sense of the industrial applicability requirement, their congruence 
with the informed views of technological philosophy does not ap-
pear promising at first glance.  Patent laws and regulations lack the 
quality of disciplined reflection apparent in the writings of techno-
logical philosophy.  Indeed, the pronunciative and succinct nature 
of these administrative texts contrasts strongly with the sustained 
and reasoned discussion of other observers in delimiting that which 
is technological. 
But despite the differing purposes and perspectives of these au-
thors, the industrial application standard appears very much in 
keeping with the characterizations of technology offered by con-
temporary technological thinking.  In essence both regimes recog-
nize their own subject matter by its distinguishing traits: produc-
tion or transformation of artifacts; interaction with the external 
environment; systematic manipulation of physical forces; and the 
presence of design.  Technological activities expend resources and 
knowledge in order to fabricate or modify products, or to develop 
procedural systems for so doing.  Last, technology presents a form 
of rational and systematic knowledge, oriented towards efficiency 
and capable of being assessed through objective criteria.265 
As in other contexts, to include some things is to exclude oth-
ers.  The touchstone of industrial application would exempt from 
the patent system matters of social observation or human behavior.  
Along with techniques from economics, psychology and the social 
sciences, methods of doing business would also lack the requisite 
of industrial applicability.  Business methods may be amenable to 
reasoned analysis and motivated towards efficient practice, but 
they are not transformative in character.  They do not manipulate 
physical forces to achieve the production or transformation of ma-
terial objects.  Such methods engage economic principles rather 
than the laws of physics, chemistry or biology.  They do not com-
 
264. Id. at 7. 
265. See supra Part II.B. 
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prise technology, and should not be within the grasp of the patent 
system. 
The industrial application standard would also remove from the 
patent system matters of the aesthetic or personal skill.  Culturally 
and historically, we would not count endeavors in such fields as 
athletics, dance or surgery as technological, and neither should our 
patent system.  To view these things as technology is, as Mitcham 
says, to approach them in an improper manner.266  However such 
methods as swinging baseball bats, performing dance steps or 
dressing wounds call for the manipulation of external objects, these 
aspects of human society are principally acquired through personal 
experience.  They do not involve the creation or transformation of 
material objects and are not repeatable in an industrial sense.  We 
also appear to lack objective mechanisms for evaluating this sub-
ject matter in light of the requisites of patentability. 
The bearing of the industrial application standard towards 
claims drafted in artifact format appears more complex.  The State 
Street opinion provides a fine example of this difficulty, for 
the claims at issue there were drafted not in method format, but in 
terms of a “data processing system” consisting of hardware ele-
ments.267  This orientation towards artifacts proved to be particu-
larly deft claim drafting, for the Federal Circuit reposed great con-
fidence in this characterization and repeatedly spoke of Signature’s 
invention as a “machine” within the grasp of the patent statute.268  
A machine, unlike a pure process claim directed towards a busi-
ness method, would at first blush appear susceptible to industrial 
application.  Yet if our sense of patent eligibility becomes wholly 
subject to artful claim drafting, we have little hope of confining the 
patent system to the technological.269 
The decision of the United Kingdom Patent Courts in Merrill 
Lynch presents a sensible resolution of this question.270  Of course, 
the patent law of the United Kingdom reflects that of the European 
Patent Convention in requiring that patentable inventions be capa-
 
266. See supra text accompanying note 229. 
267. 149 F.3d at 1371. 
268. See supra text accompanying note 111. 
269. See Thomas, supra note 98, at 257-61. 
270. Merrill Lynch Inc.’s Application, [1988] RPC 1. 
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ble of industrial application.271  Further, the application at issue, 
directed towards an automatic securities trading system, was 
analogous to that of the patent in State Street.  Merrill Lynch’s ap-
plication described a computerized system that allowed customers 
to buy and sell stocks.  The patent claims were set forth in func-
tional terms, reciting a data processing system for enabling a secu-
rities trading market.272 
Following a rejection of the application by the examiner, 
Merrill Lynch requested a hearing at the United Kingdom Patent 
Office.  The principal examiner affirmed in reasoning that appears 
fully applicable to the facts in State Street: 
If the task performed is non-technical, for example a 
mathematical calculation or a business method, then the 
mere fact that it is being performed by a suitable machine, 
whether or not this involves a program, does not of itself 
provide a technical feature.  I consider this to be a logical 
extension of the generally accepted view that there is no in-
vention in merely stating that a known manual function is 
performed automatically even if this is expressed in terms 
of “means” for performing the essential parts of the func-
tion. 
I consider that the “means” specified . . . relate to features 
which either would be present in a conventional business 
computer system or define essential features required for 
the performance of the business method.  Consequently this 
claim contains nothing which could be considered to con-
stitute a new technical structure or to produce a technical 
effect . . . .  I conclude therefore that this claim does not 
constitute a patentable invention.273 
The Patents Court once again affirmed on appeal.  Applying 
Article 52 of the European Patent Convention, the court noted the 
argument of counsel that: 
whether a patent could be obtained for a computer program, 
 
 271.   Id. 
272. Id. 
273. Merrill Lynch Inc.’s Application, [1988] RPC 1. 
THOMASFMT.DOC 9/29/2006  3:28 PM 
56 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.10:3 
itself novel and not obvious, would be a matter of drafting, 
depending on the form of claim drafted.  If claimed as a 
computer program it would not be patentable as excluded 
under [Article 52]; but a computer programmed to carry out 
that program would be patentable even though a conven-
tional computer operating in a conventional manner when 
carrying out the various steps of the program.  That seems 
to me to be a result that cannot have been intended by Par-
liament.274 
Similar analysis should apply to “system” claims drafted to 
convey the sense of a hardware embodiment.  If we mean to ex-
clude methods of doing business from the regime of patents, then 
we should as well reject claims reciting computerized methods 
where the only patentable teaching lies in the realm of business 
rather than technology.  To do otherwise is to exalt form over sub-
stance, an argument that has been made extensively elsewhere.275 
The United States Patent Office’s recently issued Software 
Guidelines appear to urge similar results.  The Guidelines recog-
nize that because “[t]here is always some form of physical trans-
formation within a computer because a computer acts on signals 
and transforms them during its operation and changes the state of 
its components during the execution of a process,” such activity 
alone is not determinative.276  The Guidelines instead provide that 
the “utility of the invention must be within the technological arts” 
for it to be patentable, pointing to the familiar requirements of 
physical transformation and practical application.277  Based on this 
and other text within the Guidelines, at least one commentator 
concluded that the Guidelines would render most computer-
implemented business methods unpatentable.278 
The Patent Office Deputy Commissioner took a different posi-
tion, however, instead considering the Federal Circuit’s State 
 
274. Merrill Lynch’s Application, [1989] RPC 561.  
275. Most articulately in Stern, supra note 63.  See also Richard H. Stern, Solving 
the Algorithm Conundrum: After 1994 In the Federal Circuit, the Patent Law Needs a 
Radical Algorithmectomy, 22 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 167 (1994). 
276. SOFTWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 7484. 
277. Id. at 7479, 7483. 
278. See Del Gallo, supra note 46, at 425-27. 
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Street opinion to have “ratified the validity of the approach taken” 
in the Guidelines.279  Given the “Delphic” character of the Guide-
lines280 and their inability to dictate examiner decisions,281 overre-
liance upon the Guidelines seems inappropriate.  The fact remains 
that the Patent Office has experienced a “boom” in applications 
claiming business methods and, following State Street, appears 
obliged to allow them to mature into granted patents.282 
A legislative approach appears the best possibility for remind-
ing the patent system that not everything we do is technological.  
Congress would do well to import the requirement of industrial ap-
plicability into United States patent law.  This touchstone not only 
parallels much of the teachings of contemporary thought concern-
ing technology, it would provide a proven criterion that already ef-
fects the majority of the world’s issued patents.  And not only does 
the TRIPS Agreement expressly allow signatories to impose this 
requirement,283 its adoption would move the United States further 
in the direction of global patent harmonization.284 
Of course, no claim can be made that industrial application 
would offer a panacea for our patent eligibility ills.  The European 
Patent Office has arguably drifted from the reasoning of Merrill 
Lynch in a handful of recent opinions involving computer-
implemented methods.285  The Japanese Patent Office too seems 
 
279. See Oberdorfer, supra note 7. 
280. Richard H. Stern, On Defining the Concept of Infringement of Intellectual 
Property Rights in Algorithms and Other Computer-Related Ideas, 23 AM. INTELL. PROP. 
L. ASS’N Q.J. 401, 408 n.17 (Summer 1995). 
281. See SOFTWARE GUIDELINES, supra note 184, at 7479 (“These Guidelines do not 
constitute substantive rulemaking and hence do not have the force and effect of law.”). 
282.  See Oberdorfer, supra note. 7. 
283. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 27(1). 
284. See HAROLD C. WEGNER, PATENT HARMONIZATION § 2300 (1993). 
285. In particular see the controversial decision General-Purpose Management Sys-
tem/SOHEI, T 769/92, 1995 OJ EPO 525 (May 31, 1994).  The lengthy claims at issue 
before the European Patent Office Board of Appeal defined computer hardware, data 
storage files, and a plurality of processing means for controlling the hardware and for 
storing, updating, reading and outputting the data.  The patent application described the 
system as useful for financial and inventory management, and in particular construction 
management.  Thus the system might, for example, track the work to be done on a par-
ticular site within the construction industry. 
 According to the Board, the claimed invention involved technical considerations be-
cause it involved a novel use of different files to cause the computer to perform different 
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favorably disposed towards the patenting of known computer 
hardware that does no more than process data in a novel way.286  
But adoption of the industrial application standard here would ren-
der the current patentability debate a far more sober one.  Rather 
than remain paralyzed by the complex issues surrounding the pat-
entability of computer-related inventions, we should recognize that 
a broader movement is afoot.  The stewards of our patent system 
would do well to consider informed responses to our increasingly 
ambitious scope of patenting, rather than rely upon the patent bar 
to stage an informed debate on the appropriate vision of appropri-
able subject matter. 
CONCLUSION 
Each issue of the Patent Office Gazette seems to include pro-
prietary processes from an unlikely collection of disciplines.  Al-
though we once might have relegated these claims to some popular 
compilation of unusual patents,287 the Federal Circuit opinions in 
State Street and Excel have imbued them with a newfound vitality.  
With the Patent Office open to patents on business method and 
data transformation, the frontiers of the patent system appear virtu-
ally without limit.  The patent system now seems poised to impact 
callings ranging from the arts, to the social sciences, to the law it-
self. 
There is much to commend the adoption of the standard of in-
dustrial application in the United States patent law.  For our patent 
law should comport with our perception of what technology is, not 
defy it.  By restoring a patentablility standard firmly grounded in 
industrial applicability, rather than equating technology with any-
 
tasks.  Moreover, the Board noted that management of construction sites was comparable 
to the management of traditional manufacturing processes.  The claimed invention could 
therefore not be considered a method of doing business excluded from patentability by 
the European Patent Convention.  Although arguably quite a different case than Merrill 
Lynch, the reasoning of the SOHEI Board offers ample possibilities for artful claims 
drafters to overcome the restrictions upon patentable subject matter within the European 
Patent Convention. 
286. See JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES FOR INVENTIONS IN 
SPECIFIC FIELDS, Computer Software Related Inventions, § 2.2.1, (c)-2 (iii) (1997) 
(AIPPI). 
287. See e.g., RICK FEINBERG, PECULIAR PATENTS (1994). 
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thing artificial, we would also maintain the patent system in its 
proven paths.  We would recognize our own humanity by refusing 
to identify our entire universe as technological in character.288  
However central to contemporary life and worthy of nurturing 
through the patent system, technology is but one manifestation of 
the human experience, not the only one. 
 
288. The writings of Martin Heidegger suggest this concern.  See Martin Heidegger, 
The Question Concerning Technology, in BASIC WRITINGS, 287, 308 (David Farrell Krell 
trans., 1977) (“As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, 
but exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but 
the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall, 
that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-
reserve.”); MARTIN HEIDEGGER, DISCOURSE ON THINKING 56 (John M. Anderson & E. 
Hans Freund trans., 1966) (“the approaching tide of technological advancement in the 
atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking 
may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking.”). 
